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COMMENT
IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT THROUGH RULEMAKING: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. v. NUCLEAR
REGULA TORY COMMISSION
In August of 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responding to a ruling of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, issued a policy statement that declared a virtual
moratorium on the licensing of nuclear power plants.1 The policy
statement announced essentially that no new permits to build
nuclear reactor plants or licenses to operate them would be issued
until the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle 2 could be
reassessed by the Commission. The Commission also announced
141 Fed. Reg. 34,707 (1976).
On October 13 the Commission proposed an interim fuel cycle rule responding
to the court decisions and solicited comments on both the proposed revisions to the
rule which it contained, and a related impact survey called Environmental Survey
of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle. Soon
thereafter, on November 5, the Commission lifted the moratorium on the issuance
of operating licenses, construction permits and limited work authorizations, and
suspended the show-cause proceedings pending the anticipated adoption of an
interim rule.
In a notice dated March 14, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,803 (1977), the NRC
announced that it has adopted an interim fuel cycle rule. The rule was made
effective immediately upon its publication in the Federal Register and is to remain in
effect for 18 months. At that time, presumably, a final rule will have been adopted.
This action marks the formal adoption of a basis for continued licensing, as well
as the termination of show-cause proceedings previously suspended. Under the
notice, operating licenses, construction permits, and limited work authorizations
issued before July 21, 1976 (in which the originally effective chemical reprocessing
and waste storage values of the original rule were used) will remain effective,
principally because the values in the newly adopted interim rule have been judged
by the Commission not to be sufficiently different from the values in the original
to warrant revocation or suspension on cost-benefit grounds.
Licenses, permits and limited work authorizations issued in the interim must
take into account the revised values contained in the interim rule. However, because the Commission has determined that the interim rule values are not substantially different from those originally proposed last October, in pending cases
where the evidentiary record on fuel cycle impact issues has already been compiled,
decisions are to be made on the basis of the existing record.
2 The uranium fuel for nuclear power plants is produced, used, and reclaimed
in a multistep "fuel cycle' ending with the permanent disposal of residual wastes.
The constituent parts of the uranium fuel cycle are mining and milling of uranium
ore, its chemical conversion to a usable form, its enrichment in fissionable isotopes,
its fabrication into fuel, its fissioning in a reactor to produce power, reprocessing
of spent fuel, disposal of radioactive waste, and intermediate transportation links.
(148)
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that it would entertain show-cause petitions seeking the revocation
or suspension of any existing license or permit on fuel cycle
grounds.
Four years earlier, the Atomic Energy Commission 3 had instituted rulemaking proceedings to collect and summarize information
on the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle for use in
the detailed statement of environmental impact required in individual reactor licensing proceedings by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).4 The procedures used by the Commission to adduce the fuel cycle effects attributable to a typical
nuclear power plant entailed three steps: publication of the proposed rule, the taking of written and oral evidence, and issuance
of new regulations with accompanying explanation. A notice of
proposed amendments to the agency's environmental review regulations was published in the Federal Register. 5 The notice also
announced the availability of a report underlying the proposed
amendments prepared by the Commission's technical staff.' The
Commission solicited public comments on the amendments and
invited all interested persons to become parties to legislative-type
hearings. The hearings were held early in 1973, and all parties
were allowed to submit written and oral statements.7 After the
hearings and the filing of post-hearing written material, the Commission issued the Uranium Fuel Cycle Regulation requiring that
the values set forth in the regulation be factored into the NEPA
analysis for all proposed nuclear power plants.8 Following the
issuance of the rule, two dissatisfied participants in the rulemaking,
Natural Resources Defense Council and Consolidated National
Intervenors, petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. 9
Relying on its own precedent, the court held that the fuel
reprocessing and waste disposal portions of the rulemaking record
3 The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished by the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5879 (Supp. V 1975) and its licensing and regula-

tory functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, id. §§ 58415849. Hereinafter, "Commission" refers to either the AEC or NRC.
442 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972).
6 UNrxmD STATES

ATOMIC ENEGY Coisio
Znssi~,

Tmn NucLEAn FUEL CIycL

ENvmoNmENTA.

SURVEY OF

(1972).

738 Fed. Reg. 49 (1973).
8 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188 (1974).
9 judicial review of rulemaking orders is authorized by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 § 189, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
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did not contain sufficient explanation and support.10 This conclusion rested on a finding that the procedures" used were not
"sensitive" enough to "ventilate" the issues. Full ventilation
through -unspecified "procedural devices" was held to be necessary
for "the innovative task of implementing NEPA through rulemaking." 11
The court's decision and the attendant licensing moratorium
shocked an already troubled nuclear energy industry.' More importantly, the judicial prescription of special adversarial procedures
for the formulation of generic environmental regulations has
thrown a long shadow on rulemaking as an emerging tool for the
application of NEPA to agency programs and policies. "Hybrid
rulemaking"-the use of procedures in excess of the minimum required by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) '1 or an
agency's organic statute-is primarily the judicial creation of the
D.C. Circuit.14 This court is uniquely positioned to shape administrative practice in this country 15 and has been highly instru1o Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977) (No. 76-419).
This case was decided jointly with No. 74-1385 involving a challenge to the treatment of fuel cycle issues in the operating license proceeding of the Vermont Yankee
nuclear power plant.
31 Id. 653.
12 Besides threatening delay of several power plants near completion, the court's
ruling cast doubt on the continuing validity of licenses in force. See, e.g., General
Statement of Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,707 (1976); MacLachian, Nuclear Power in
Crisis: Everyone Has a Bad Word for the NRC as It Walks the Legal Tightrope,
Energy Daily, Aug. 18, 1976 at 1, col. 1; Nuclear's Tough Day in Court, Nuci n
NEws, Sept. 1976 at 29-31. The dollar cost of regulatory delay is staggering. For
example, the licensing delay for one nuclear plant under construction is reported
to cost $225 million. Busnss Wan_, Jan. 24, 1977 at 22.
13 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
14
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CH. L. REv. 401 (1975). This Comment
does not explore the legal theories and ultimate wisdom of hybrid rulemaking in
detail. Only those issues particularly pertinent to rulemaking and NEPA are recounted. For a fuller analysis, see Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: HearingVariations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct and Other FederalStatutes, 75 COLum. L. REv. 721 (1975); Verkul,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. BEx. 185 (1974); Williams,
supra; Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CoNmar_. L. REv. 375 (1974); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining
Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 782 (1974).
15 The District of Columbia Circuit Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
a number of administrative actions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Federal Energy Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-(b)(1) (1970) (EPA); 42
U.S.C. §4915(a) (Supp. V 1975) (EPA); 15 U.S.C. §766(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V
1975) (FEA). Final orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Cornmunications Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, and the Federal Power
Commission are also subject to review in the D.C. Circuit, rgardless of the residence of the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. §§2342(4), 2343 (1970) (NRC); 28 U.S.C.
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mental in forming the law under NEPA, 1 a statute which reaches
every major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 17 The pronouncement of new circumstances
requiring hybrid procedures in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRDC v. NRC), therefore,
will have a pervasive impact.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the implications
of this seminal case. The problems involved in the judicial shaping
of rulemaking procedures and a proposed framework of analysis are
examined in sections I and II. The interrelationship among administrative rulemaking, judicial review, and the purposes of NEPA
is examined in section III. It is then argued in section IV that the
legal and analytical principles, discussed in section II, were ignored
by the court in NRDC v. NRC. An alternative analysis for the
implementation of NEPA through rulemaking is put forward in
conclusion.,
I. HYBRm

RULEMAKING-CURRENT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

Rulemaking is often described as a "quasi-legislative" function."" The procedure does resemble the legislative process, and
the resulting rules have the prospective impact of statutes. Rulemaking, however, often decides issues intimately affecting particular
classes of people and frequently turns on crucial elements of fact
normally tested for accuracy by adversary procedures. Simultaneously with its delegation of rulemaking power to agencies, therefore, Congress has taken the precaution of vesting in interested
parties the right to participate in rulemaking proceedings and the
right to seek judicial review of improperly promulgated rules. 19
These two rights are the well-springs of the hybrid-rulemaking
doctrine. Hybrid rulemaking requires incorporation of adversarial
devices into agency rulemaking when needed to guarantee procedural fairness to outside participants or to aid judicial review, at
participants' request, of promulgated rules. The case-law history
of this doctrine, however, is unclear on several principle points, -and
§§2342(l), 2343 (1970) (FCC); 28 U.S.C. §§2342(3), 2343 (1970) (FMC);
16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970) (FTC).
16 See text accompanying notes 116-153 infra.
17 Section 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
1
8E.g., City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1074 (1972), and cases cited therein at n.49.
19
For example, §189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2239(a) & (b)
(1970) provides that in rulemaking the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the
request of any person whose interest may be affected and all rules shall be subject
to judicial review in accordance with § 10 of the APA.
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these uncertainties in the hybrid rulemaking doctrine are traps
both for the administrative agencies and for the reviewing courts.
Without a suitable analytical framework for assessing the sufficiency
of rulemaking procedures, the courts risk encroaching upon the
prerogatives of administrators and unwittingly prescribing procedural remedies that hinder the long run utility of informal decisionmaking. Cautious administrators, unsure of what is required
to satisfy the judiciary, may stifle the flexibility of informal rulemaking through an over-abundant use of adversarial procedures
approaching the complement of formal rulemaking, or, and this is
the more probable danger, they may seek means to circumvent institution of informal rulemaking altogether.2 0 This section examines
the uncertainty in current analytical approaches to informal rulemaking as an introduction to a proposed alternative analysis. This
alternative, presented in the following section, attempts to reconcile
the goals of procedural fairness, close judicial scrutiny, and administrative efficiency.
A. ProceduralFairness
The APA provides for two classes of rulemaking: "formal" and
"informal". Formal rulemaking under sections 556 and 557 21 is
used when "rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing." 2 Parties to formal rulemaking are entitled to conduct cross-examination except when they
"will not be prejudiced [by lack thereof]." 23 Informal rulemaking
under section 553 2 can be used when formal rulemaking is not
required.
Informal rulemaking involves a three step process. First, general notice of the proposed rulemaking must be published in the
Federal Register, including specific notice of the "terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved." 2 Second, the agency must "give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in [the] rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." 20 Finally, when the rule is promul20

See Wright, supra note 14, at 379-81.

215 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970).
221d. §553(c) (1970).
23 Id. § 556(d).
24 Id. § 553.
2z Id. § 553(b) (3).
261d. § 553(c).
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gated the agency must provide a statement of the rule's "basis and
purpose." 27 Interested outside parties participate directly only in
the first two steps. Participatory fairness, therefore, is a function
28
of proper notice and opportunity to make a presentation.
If rulemaking participants are not alerted to the critical issues
being considered by the agency, then the opportunity to affect the
outcome is only a superficial ritual. The courts are vigilant to
guard against this abuse of delegated power and are not hesitant to
require amended proceedings guaranteeing the parties the right to
contest the rule's underpinnings. 29 The more difficult task is defining the proper content of a participant's right to submit views
and information. The Courts of Appeals, particularly the D.C. Circuit, have found that fairness requires that a party to a rulemaking
be given an opportunity to make an "effective" presentation. 30
The leading example of this interpretation is Walter Holm &
Co. v. Hardin,3 1 where the court examined regulations issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture establishing minimum marketing sizes for
Florida tomatoes.3 2 Importers of Mexican tomatoes challenged the
rule contending that the size differential between "vine ripe" and
"mature green" tomatoes established in the regulation was intended
to discriminate against imports and that a hearing was necessary to
assure rational and non-discriminatory rulemaking. The court
agreed and ordered hearings with a limited right of cross-examination on "crucial issues." 33 The court's opinion, written by Judge
Leventhal, included a discussion of the factual nature of the findings
27 Id.

28

. "The procedure chosen by the Commission must of course give the parties
fair notice of exactly what the Commission proposes to do, together with opportunity to comment, to object, and to make wrtiten submissions .... .. " American
Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
29 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 964 (1974) (agency reliance on factual support in
another proceeding improper due to lack of opportunity given participants to
respond to the incorporation of that record); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckeishaus,
486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (lack of
adequate opportunity for participants to comment on EPA's proposed air pollution
performance standards due to the non-disclosure of detailed findings and testing
procedures); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972) (participant not deprived of opportunity to present
relevant information by lack of notice that the issue was there).
30
See Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DuxE LJ. 51, 74-80.
31449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32 The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1970),
authorized the Secretary to issue regulations governing the sale of certain commodities in order to support market prices.
33 449 F.2d at 1016.
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in the rule-a
-inch differential in the size of tomatoes, the risk
of industry influence in the decisionmaking, and plaintiffs' "not
insubstantial claim" that the only effective method to reach the full
and true basis of decision was an oral presentation. The combination of these elements convinced the court that petitioners were
denied "the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective
presentation." 34
The court did not explain with crystal clarity what crucial
issues trigger the requirement for adversary procedures beyond
written submissions, nor has any court in a subsequent discussion
of the concept of basic fairness in rulemaking participation. 5 The
only other clues to the content of this test came in International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus.3 6 In another Leventhal opinion, the
court commented on the basic fairness of the procedures used by the
Environmental Protection Agency to rule on the availability of autoIn
mobile technology to meet pollution emission standards.3
slightly elliptical terms, the court distinguished between a claimed
broad right of cross-examination and a "circumscribed and justified"
right to cross-examination on a "subject of critical importance which
could not be adequately ventilated under the general procedures." 38
No guidance was given as to what showing a participant must make
to prove that minimum statutory procedures are unfair. The only
description of "critical" subjects was provided by the adjectives
" 'soft' and 'sensitive.' " One is left to surmise from the context
that "soft" means in dispute and evading clear resolution; "sensitive" probably connotes a repetitive concern that the subject be
central to the decision.
The only clear inference to be drawn from these cases is that a
challenger to agency rulemaking procedures must demonstrate that
additional steps are necessary for the full and true disclosure that
alone makes possible the informed agency decisionmaking con34Id. It is possible to read the opinion as only interpreting the relevant
statute to require notice and hearing; see Williams, supra note 14, at 427.

The concept of effective presentation was adopted in somewhat vague terms in
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). The court held
that the EPA could dispense with hearings before adopting state implementation

plans for ambient air pollution reduction under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-5 (1970), if the hearings at the state level were "adequate." 477 F.2d at
502. Adequacy included the Walter Holm formnulation of a contingent right to
limited cross-examination.
35
See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecot
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
06 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37 For a discussion of the facts and analysis of the court's basis of decision, 'see
text accompanying text notes 92-100, infra.

38 478 F.2d at 631.
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templated by Congress. Given the uncertain nature and pervasive
impact of the Walter Holm standard, courts have appropriately
placed on challengers the burden of showing a prima facie case of
unfairness. 39 Post hoc amendment to the statutory procedures of
informal rulemaking is seen as the exceptional course taken only in
the clearest cases of unfairness.40
B. Judicial Scrutiny of the Administrative Record as
a Determinant of Agency Procedures
Even if challengers to an administrative rulemaking are afforded basic procedural fairness, the courts sometimes impose hybrid
procedures to create a record sufficiently detailed to allow meaningful court review. 41 Again the D.C. Circuit has been the major
architect of this judicial technique.
The first full explanation of a remand for more procedures to
aid judicial review came from Judge Wilkey, speaking for the court
in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC.4 There an informal rulemaking resulted in an order by the Federal Power Commission setting rates
for the transportation of liquifiable hydrocarbons produced with
natural gas. On review of the order, the court held that sections
four and five of the Natural Gas Act,43 conferring ratemaking au39 The best examples of this burden are again from the D.C. Circuit:
Although the petitioners claim that cross-examination of live witnesses was
necessary they do not point to any specific weakness in the proof which
might have been explored or developed more fully by that technique than
by the procedures adopted by the Commission. .

.

. [Pletitioners do not

suggest what questions were necessary for this purpose, nor do they explain
why their written submittals were ineffectual.
American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Nowhere in the record is there any specific proffer by petitioners as to the
subjects they believed required oral hearings, what kind of facts they
proposed to adduce, and by what witnesses, etc. Nor was there any
specific proffer as to particular lines of cross-examination which required
exploration at an oral hearing.
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[Participant's] comments must
be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality before
any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern.").
One commentator has summarized the challengers' duty quite simply: "The
premise in all 'hybrid rulemaking' cases is that the challengers have raised questions
about the agency's substantive action that are so serious that the agency must
justify its position more adequately than it has." Williams, supra note 14, at 454.
40
E.g., NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Tamm, J.
concurring), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977) (No. 76-419).
41
See Williams, supra note 14, at 417-18.

42483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1970).

43
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thority on the Commission, did not require use of formal rulemaking procedures, but that the judicial review section of the Act
did require a finding of "substantial evidence." 44 From this prerequisite, Judge Wilkey concluded that "more than the comparatively feeble protections of section 553 of the APA may be called
for."

45

His "flexible" approach turned on what was necessary to

effectuate the regulatory scheme and the degree of fact-dispute
resolution necessary in the proceeding. 46 Considering the traditional definition of substantial evidence, which requires that the
"whole record" be considered, 47 Judge Wilkey reasoned that:
A "whole record" as that phrase is used in this context,
does not consist merely of the raw data introduced by the
parties. It includes the process of testing and illumination
ordinarily associated with adversary, adjudicative procedures. Without this critical element, informal comments, even by adverse parties, are two halves that do not
make a whole. Thus, it is adversary procedural devices
which permit testing and elucidation that raise information from the level of mere inconsistent
data to evidence
"substantial" enough to support rates.48
4415 U.S.C. §717(r)(b) (1970).
The statute provides that "the finding
of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence shall be
conclusive." The APA provides two alternative tests for judicial review: "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," and
"unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. §§706(2)(A), (E) (1970).
Which is used depends on the courts' interpretation of the type of proceeding and
standard of review intended by Congress in drafting the agency's organic statute.
See Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed
Standard,84 YALE LJ. 1750, 1750-51 (1975).
45 483 F.2d at 1254.
46 Id. 1254, 1257.
47 Id. 1258 n.73 citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLBB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Professor Nathanson suggests that Judge Wilkey really relied on the definition of
substantial evidence found in § 706 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), which is
used for formal proceedings under §§ 556 and 557, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970),
thereby going as far as one can go in treating the procedures as "on the record"
without invoking § 553(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). Nathanson, supra note 14,
at 737 n.91.
48 483 F.2d at 1260. By rejecting the adequacy of informal rulemaking in
establishing FPC rates, the court specifically disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). Subsequently, another panel of the D.C. Circuit
endorsed FPC's setting of initial rates by the use of rulemaking procedures. American Public Gas Ass'n v. FTC, 498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam). For
a discussion of these cases, and possible distinctions between them, see Nathanson,
supra note 14, at 734 n.77. See also, Williams, supra note 14, at 428-32.
The correspondence articulated by Judge Wilkey between the degree of evidentiary support required to sustain judicial approval and the degree of rigor appropriate in rulemaking procedures was an elaboration of a principle announced
previously by the D.C. Circuit in City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C.
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When the D.C. Circuit considered another FPC rulemaking in
Public Service Commission v. FPC4 9 attention again focused on the

prerequisites to proper judicial review. In this case, the court
found error not in the factual predicate of the rulemaking, but in
the methodology. The rule under scrutiny established rates for
natural gas producers in the Texas Gulf Area.5 0 Through formal
rulemaking the Commission had established base rates and special
incentives for exploration and extraction. The court unanimously
invalidated the special incentives because the Commission had incorporated the record from another ratemaking proceeding as
factual support for this part of the rate schedule and thereby denied
challengers an opportunity to respond and hampered judicial review. 1' Two members of the panel, Chief Judge Bazelon and
Judge Richey, went further to find that meaningful review of the
base rates was also impossible because a "reasoned justification of
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972). The agency rule under review
in Chicago was promulgated under section 16 of the Natural Gas Act which authorizes FPC rulemaking as "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions"
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970). The Commission argued that judicial reveiw
of a rule so promulgated was restricted to assessing the adequacy of the procedures
used and not the adequacy of the findings.
The court strongly disagreed, asserting that "some inquiry into the factual
predicate for rules promulgated by the Commission is required when review of
those rules is sought here." 458 F.2d at 743. The first premise of the opinion was
that "[wihatever procedure is utilized, a primary objective is the acquisition of
information which will enable the Commission to carry out effectively the provisions" of the Act. Id. The court was satisfied that in these circumstances, the
Commission had "tailor[ed] the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the information it need[ed] to illuminate those issues and the manner of presentation which,
in its judgment, [brought] before it the relevant information in the most efficient
manner." Id. at 744. What distinguishes the results in Mobil Oil and Chicago,
then, is how each panel judged the degree of evidentiary support required for rulemaking under different sections of the Natural Gas Act. The Mobil Oil court held
that "findings" under §§ 4 and 5 required substantial evidence, while the Chicago
court found § 16 rulemaking subject to a less rigorous examination of the factual
predicate.
The court in Chicago also found that application of the substantial evidence
test to a record of generalized information untested by cross-examination "would
be of scant utility." Instead the court endorsed the Overton Park standard. For
a discussion of that standard, see text accompanying note 144 infra. Having limited
judicial review to a "searching and careful" probe of the record compiled by the
minimum procedural requirements of APA § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), the court
found it unnecessary to determine whether additional procedures were necessary. Id.
Both the Mobil Oil court and the Chicago court agree that in judicial review
of any rulemaking record, the sufficiency of the promulgating procedures is a
function of the type and weight of facts necessary to support the rule.
49487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 964
(1974).
5oFor an analysis sketching the development of FPC rate rulemaking, see
Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-The New Approach at the F.P.C.: Ad Hoc Rulemaking in the Ratemaking Process, 1973 Dtmz LJ. 41.
51487 F.2d at 1071, 1080.
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the relationship between [the natural gas shortage] and the magnitude of the adjustments in the rates . . . made in response to
it" was absent.52 Chief Judge Bazelon conceded that the FPC might
lack the "methodological tools" to supply the "evidentiary basis
and reasoned justification" required, but felt constrained by the
congressional intent that judicial review "be conscionably exercised." 53 Without a reasonably clear articulation of how the
agency reasoned from the significant facts to the ultimate decision,
he could not endorse the base rates.
Judge Wilkey's 'requirement that inconsistent data be raised to
the level of substantial evidence is a restriction of an agency's latitude in fact gathering. Chief Judge Bazelon's requirement that an
agency draw a sufficient link between the salient issues and the
proposed solution is an attempt to define an acceptable level of
accuracy for agency predictions. Read together, Mobil Oil and
Public Service Commission call for agency procedures adequate to
test the crucial facts and an explanation of the inferences drawn
from these facts which rationally supports the ultimate conclusion.
The difficulty with this combination test, however, is that it
fails to distinguish between facts that must be established and inferences that must only be explained. In many situations there is a
broad range of issues that bear rational classification either as facts
requiring evidentiary support or as inferences chosen from many
plausible interpretations as a matter of discretionary, policy judgment. For example, is a causal connection between increased revenues for natural gas producers and increased investment in gas
exploration a "fact" revealed from evidence or an inference shaped
primarily by policy considerations? Or is it a mixture of both?
The effect can be evidenced, but the exact correlation between how
much profit induces how much investment escapes quantification
and rests on policy judgment. Obviously, there is no positive test
for separating those issues that must be decided on substantial
factual support from those assigned to policy resolution. Whether
a rule is to survive judicial review, however, often turns solely on
that determination. For example, Judge Leventhal strenously disagreed with the majority of the court in Public Service Commission
over the range of discretion afforded the FPC in making natural gas
base rates responsive to the national shortage. To his mind, the
methodology used was squarely within the "large areas of government regulation of industry that call for judgment and necessarily
52 Id. 1098.
5a Id.
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admit of considerable imprecision." " Chief Judge Bazelon, on the
other hand, insisted that the court must be advised of exactly what
experiment the Commission was conducting and why it chose this
method of execution. 55
The disagreement between the judges probably stems from the
attitude each holds toward the "partnership" 11 of agencies and
courts as "collaborative instrumentalities of justice." 57 Each is genuinely motivated, no doubt, by his perceptions of fairness in the
rulemaking process. Judge Bazelon is explicit in his concern that
the Commission justify the imposition on consumers of a substantial
increase in price.58 Judge Leventhal considers it a duty of "responsible partnership in the public interest" to allow the FPC
latitude in solving the gas shortage.5 9 The dispute is irreconcilable
because there can be no universally acceptable standard of fairness
when societal goals conflict.
A third member of the D.C. Circuit, Judge Wright, has capsulized the dilemma of rulemaking fairness that troubles his colleagues:
[I]t makes no sense to speak of a rule as being fair or
unfair to an individual in an objective sense of accuracy.
A rule allocates benefits and penalties among large classes
of individuals according to a specific normative standard,
and the fairness of such an allocation is ultimately a
political or philosophical question. 60
The distinction between fairness in disputes over evidentiary accuracy and fairness in normative conflicts is the linchpin of the
alternative analytical approach discussed next.
54 487 F.2d at 1066.
55 Id. 1098.
56
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Leventhal, J), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
57 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.); see
also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (Bazelon, CJ.): 'Ve stand on the threshold of a new era in the history
of the long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing
courts." Id. 597.
58 487 F.2d at 1097.
59 Id. 1067.
60
Wright, supra note 14, at 379. Judge Wright followed with the conclusion
that "in the rulemaking context, fairness is not identified with accuracy, and procedures designed to maximize accuracy at the cost of all other values are simply
inappropriate." Id.
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REVIEW AND REMEDY

A. The Three Steps in Decisionmaking
Understanding a court's dissatisfaction with an inadequate informal rulemaking is easier if this type of decisionmaking process is

segmented into its component parts.6 ' Decisionmaking involves
(1) the production of an empirical base-the factual predicate-for
(2) drawing inferences in a principled fashion-the methodology-

and (3) the exercise of policy judgment to reach final conclusions.62
6-1The intimacy between the court's supervisory function and an agency's
decisionmaking processes is explained cogently by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971). For Judge Leventhal proper judicial review extends far enough into
the substance of rulemaking to ascertain whether the agency engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking:
The function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned
consideration to all the material facts and issues. This calls for insistence

that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision,
and identify the significance of the crucial facts, a course that tends to
assure that the agency's policies affectuate general standards, applied without unreasonable discrimination.
Id. 851. The correlative restriction on the court is judicial restraint in upsetting an
agency's findings if the "agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of
reasons and standards." Id.
62 For the most part this Comment will employ the term "factflnding" or its
equivalent to refer to both assembly of a factual predicate and application of a
methodology to generate further inferences of fact on the basis of the assembled
data. In this manner the three-step decisionmaking process will often be treated
rather as a dichotomy between "factflnding" and "policy formulation." Similarly,
issues that relate either to factual predicate or to methodology usually will be
classed indifferently as issues of "fact" in contrast to those that arise in connection
with the exercise of policy judgment, which are classed as issues of "policy."
Although this Comment treats methodological issues uniformly as issues of fact
rather than policy, a further dissection of methodological issues into issues of fact
and issues of policy is possible. Where scientific consensus exists as to the range of
sophistication among methodologies such that in effect one is demonstrably more
accurate in its results than another, arguments over methodology are properly treated
as issues of fact. Clearly, however, scientific consensus regarding a rank ordering
of methodologies is often impossible. One example from economics may serve as an
illustration. An economist wishing to make predictions concerning the behavior of
individuals confronted with uncertainty has at least two methodological assumptions
open to him: that individuals are generally risk-adverse or alternatively that they
are generally risk-takers. The economists predictions will differ significantly according to his choice of methodological assumption. Were an agency administrator
called upon to adopt one of the sets of predictions, his selection is unlikely to
have the benefit of a consensus among economists as to which methodological
assumption yields the most "accurate" results, that is, results conforming closest to
"reality." In this example as in many others, the administrator's selection will most
likely be guided by policy preference. Thus, at least in some cases, the appropriateness of adversarial procedures for the sharpening of methodological issues is
open to contest. This Comment, however, will address its criticism only to the
prescription of hybrid procedures for the "ventillation" of policy issues that arise
at the third step of the decisionmaking process.
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Rulemaking, with its particular mixture of these elements, is preferred over adjudication in those cases when an ultimate conclusion
cannot be deduced from the factual residue of the first two steps. 3
In many cases, especially in technical decisionmaking, a fully sufficient evidentiary basis is practicably unknowable, or the inferences
to be drawn are unavoidably uncertain. For example, accurate
predictions of and acceptable limits for exposure to risk are very
often beyond the available techniques of measurement.64
The limits on measuring risk have been demonstrated by the
litigation under statutes designed to protect consumer safety and
public health. Excellent examples are the regulations issued under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 65 which
must rest on conclusions about the carcenogenic effect of pesticides.
The only findings possible may be inconclusive tests showing some
cancer causation in laboratory animals. Expert analysis can translate this data into a conjectural relationship between exposure level
and incidence of cancer. If an administrator chooses to ban the
substance or, alternatively, allows its continued commercial distribution, how should the propriety of the decision be measured?
Ordering social priorities does not appear to be a problem because
the clear legislative intent was to prevent the use of hazardous
materials altogether. A scientific conclusion on the threshold of
hazardousness, however, is a priority judgment on what benefits the
public may enjoy and what price in involuntary exposure is exacted
in return. If the available evidence produces no certain result, the
administrator must confront the normative conflict between the
social utility of pesticides and the associated health risk.
What makes this policy judgment different from the larger
legislative decision to ban some substances is the introduction of
trained expertise. Behind the legislative delegation to agencies of
risk determinations is a desire to mobilize the available knowledge
and resources to obtain the best estimate. 66 At some point the
limits of scientific certainty will force administrators to speculate,
but they do so with the specific approval of Congress. Agency offi67
cials are obliged to suggest the degree of risk society should accept.
63
For a detailed analysis of the intellectual process involved in rulemaking
to adjudication, see Williams, supra note 14, at 403-11.
opposed
as
64 See Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEo.
WASm. L. REv. 791 (1975); Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Suflicient Scientific
Base for Regulation, 43 GEo. WAsir. L. REv. 808 (1975).
65 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970), as amended, Federal Environmental Pesticide
Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. III 1973).
Control
66
See Green, supra note 64, at 805.
6
7 See Handler, supra note 64, at 809.
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The role of the courts is not to challenge that decision on the
merits. No factual showing will unquestionably sustain rules in
areas of tremendous uncertainty such as energy, environment, or
consumer safety. Rather, the courts' task is to question whether the
concept of risk is defined in proper factual terms and estimated
with the best value-neutral methodological precision possible.
In recent years agencies have turned to rulemaking to resolve
controversies that combine technical and political disputes in an
inseparable mix. It was necessary to abandon strict adjudicatory
modes because of the nature of the problems. Accuracy, the hallmark of adjudication, is of drastically diminished importance when
social-value priorities are not sufficiently detailed to definitively
direct the choice between conflicting goals. What air pollution
standards are optimal? What safety devices should be mandatory
for automobiles? Accuracy is impossible when the practicably
available knowledge does not provide analytical constructs accounting for all relevant variables. These types of problems, impervious
to accurate solution, have no answer as a matter of fact; the best
accommodation that can be made is an optimizing compromise between conflicting interests as a matter of policy. 68
Solving the technical/political problem in situations involving
undeveloped, complex technology requires new managerial tools to
foresee and evaluate consequences without the benefit of experience
or testing.6 9 Rulemaking is adopted for problematic, technical decionmaking to address such questions of mixed fact and uncertainty
because of its quasi-legislative flexibility. The distinct value of
rulemaking inheres in the legislative mandate to reach conclusions
not framed by the assembly of data or the inferences drawn therefrom. Decisions lying beyond factual certainty must be made;
therefore, policy trade-offs between competing value judgments are
necessary.
The potential of informal rulemaking to reach beyond the
traditional limitations of adjudication was recognized early by the
Supreme Court in the renowned Storer Broadcasting70 case. The
Court determined that FCC regulations limiting how many radio
and television stations an applicant could own were valid despite
6

SBoyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 Mica L. 1REv. 111, 118-19 (1972).
69 Id. at 156; Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 So. CAL. L. REv. 371, 389 (1974). See generally,
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: UNDERSTANDING TH SOCIAL CONSEQuENCES OF TECH..
NacAL APPLICATIONS (J. Kasper ed. 1972).
70 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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the absence of a full hearing process. Rulemaking, the Court reasoned, was the appropriate method to rationally and fairly resolve
the competing values of the industry and the public. The Storer
doctrine rests on a judicial awareness that administrative policy innovation should not be straight-jacketed by adjudicatory formalities
"basically unsuited for policy rule making." 71
Furthermore, if exercised properly, rulemaking can be simultaneously efficient and fair: efficient because the gathering of evidence is expedited by. use of written submissions, and fair because
participation is extended to all interested parties.7 2 If rulemaking
is to achieve its potential, however, both parts of the process must
be legitimate: facts, such as they exist, must be found, not fabricated, and policy judgments must be rationally made, not
rationalized.
B. JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking by- Reference
to the Three Steps of Decisionmaking
A careful fractioning of the rulemaking decisional process can
achieve a balance between an agency's need for flexibility in determining appropriate policy and a court's duty to examine the decision closely. Agency freedom to decide policy can be respected
while selective borrowing from the adjudicatory mode assures that
the necessary facts are tested and formalized. In problematic regulatory areas, it should be incumbent on the agency to separate
facts, methods, and policies for judicial review. The validity of the
factual predicate and methodology must be self-evident so that,
regardless of the judicial review standard, they will be examined
with sufficient attention to divine their reasonableness. If either
factual predicate or methodology is in doubt as to its rationality,
the court should remand to the agency for more elucidating procedures or a more elaborate explanation. The primary usefulness
of adversary procedures is in testing the evidence and analysis in the
first two steps of rulemaking. The third step-the exercise of policy
judgment-is treated more deferentially, as is proper toward delegated legislative authority. Judicial scrutiny here should be
limited to ascertaining whether the agency has come forward with
a true and complete disclosure of the reasons underlying its policy
choice, including the reasons for rejecting alternative policies. Be71
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
72
See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Verkuil, supranote 14, at 248.
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yond this, substantive review of policy judgments requires only
protections against arbitrary or irrational decisions.
Interestingly, the concept of fragmenting a rulemaking record
step-wise with the principal parts of decisionmaking has been
strongly suggested, if not fully utilized, in several decisions of the
D.C. Circuit. 3 The analysis rendered in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA 74
is particularly instructive because agency rules designed to protect
the environment, health, and safety have posed intricate problems of
factual support and procedural fairness. The court undertook a
close scrutiny of the evidence supporting the EPA's regulation placing a limit on the lead content of gasoline.7 5 The court recognized
73See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); there the court applied the arbitrary and capricious test in reviewing a
safety standard issued pursuant to the National Highway Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970), requiring mandatory front-seat
head-restraints on all new cars. Challengers to the rule argued that some terms in
the Safety Act implied that a formal evidentiary hearing was required. Although
Judge McGowan refused to read the legislative history or text of the statute as an
"oblique" way of imposing formal procedures, his review was not totally deferential.
407 F.2d at 336. He insisted that the "record" of submissions made in response
to an informal rulemaking notice be accompanied by the agency's formulation of
significant issues faced and articulation of the rationale of their resolution. The
"concise general statement of . . .basis and purposes" provided for in the informal
rulemaking procedures of the APA was expected to identify the major issues and
explain the agency's reaction to them, id. 338-expectations closely paralleling those
of Mobil and Public Service Commission.
If any greater agency discretion was allowed in the informal proceedings, Judge
McGowan saw justification not in the different procedures used, nor in the review
test applied, but in the "inherently legislative nature of the task . . . where the
Department is concerned with the issuance of rules requiring basic policy determinations rather than the resolution of particular factual controversies." Id. 336.
What Judge McGowan suggests is that policy judgments are not amenable to the
rigors of procedural testing, but subject only to controls "calculated to negate the
dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality." Id. 338.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 668-69 (6th Cir.
1972), the court used the substantial evidence test in reviewing a later stage of
the Department's development of Motor Vehicle Standards. Despite the difference
in review standards, the court's analysis of the evidence and result is very similar
to that of Auto Parts. Although the challengers in Chrysler did not protest the use
of § 553 proceedings, the court cited Auto Parts with apparent approval of informal
procedures. The conclusion may be that regardless of the format used or the review
test applied, the criteria for judging the factual predicate and methodology of
rulemaking are the same. See Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Petersen, 473 F.2d 1002, 1006
(1st Cir. 1973) (applying the arbitrary and capracious test but noting that the
agency's "obligation to make findings, based on investigation and research, that
satisfies [the criteria of the Flammable Fabrics Act] lead us to a standard of review
that may differ little, if at all, from the standard normally used in substantial evidence review.") See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), and cases cited therein; Associated Indus.
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973); Nathanson,
supranote 14, at 750; Note, supra note 44, at 1758 n.42.
74501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75 Only relatively lead-free gasoline (0.05 gram/gallon) was compatible with
the catalytic converters required on a large number of 1975 model year automobiles
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that the adopted provisions necessarily relied to a large extent on
imperfect data, experiments and simulations, and educated predictions.76 A policy choice between competing social values arose
as a function of this factual uncertainty. The regulation, which
turned on differing assessments of risk and "predictions dealing with
matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge," 77 presented the
normative conflict between the risk of polluted air and the economic
burden on gasoline producers. As to the resolution of that conflict,
the court demanded only "adequate reasons and explanations, but
not 'findings' of the sort familiar from the world of adjudication." 78
The bifurcation in review standards applied to supporting data
and to ultimate policy conclusions was suggested earlier in Industrial Union v. Hodgson,79 a case dealing with asbestos exposure
regulations issued under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).s0 Judge McGowan divided the Labor Secretary's factual
determinations into two categories: conclusions resulting from the
evaluation of data and those depending primarily upon policy
judgments. The second category was supported by data insufficient
to produce any reasonably provable prediction.81
OSHA called for review of the rule using the substantial evidence standard. 2 The court applied that test to the first category
of factual determinations. As to the second category, however, the
court declared that "judicial review of inherently legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an undertaking of different dimensions." 83 Judge McGowan reasoned that policy choices "are not
susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation .

.

. as

are some factual questions." "
The logic in recognizing a difference between demonstrable
factual conclusions and policy decisions-and an attendant difference
in review standards-is incontrovertible. Strictures from judicial
by interim pollution emission standards issued by the Administrator under the Clean

Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §1857f-1-6c (1970).
70501 F.2d at 734.

77501 F.2d at 741. See also Industrial Union v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474
(D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 79-87, infra.

F.2d at 741.
79 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
8029 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
81499 F.2d at 474.
8229 U.S.C. § 655(f).
83 499 F.2d at 475 (footnotes omitted).
78 501

84 Id. It has been suggested that the Court was aided in affirmance of the
proposed rule by the statutory preference for protection of employee health in circumstances requiring a value trade-off.

Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in

Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YArE L.J. 1750, 1761-62 (1974).
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review requiring proof of the sort found in adjudication for all
agency policy judgments will surely defeat rulemaking flexibilityYs '
Agency discretion to make policy judgments is not, of course,
completely unfettered. Judge McGowan properly points out in
Industrial Union that where an administrator makes policy judgments in areas of factual uncertainty, "he should so state and go on
to identify the considerations he found persuasive." 86
The discretion that is reserved for the agency, Judge McGowan
explains, is the freedom to employ expertise in fashioning a solution
"where existing methodology or research in a new area of regulation
is deficient." s1 Agency expertise is vulnerable to attack as a legal
myth and has been abused as a shield to judicial review. 8s Nevertheless, the term conveniently summarizes that combination of prior
experience and familiarity with developing regulatory techniques
and technology that initially prompted legislative delegation of
specific power to address issues requiring expert opinion and reasoned predictions to administrative agencies.8 9 In some circumstances, accuracy in factfinding must be sacrificed to accommodate
innovation, experimentation, and simple pragmatism.9 0
Fragmenting the decisional process offers a workable substitute
for the polarized and ill-articulated tests that now obscure the rea85 See Wright, supra note 14, at 376-78.
86 499 F.2d at 476, Accord Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor,
487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir. 1973). Judge Friendly questioned "whether judicial
review of legislative standards resulting from informal rulemaking will ultimately
prove to be feasible." Judge McGowan answered in Industrial Union that it depends
partially on the court's ability "to be always mindful that at least some legislative
judgments cannot be anchored securely and solely in demonstrable fact." 499 F.2d
at 476.
87 499 F.2d at 474 n.18. Accord Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
811 (1968) (inadequate research and experience in new method of natural gas
regulation).
8 8
See, e.g., Freeman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 An. L. Ruv.
363 (1976); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HArv. L. lav. 436, 471-475

(1954).
8

9 The introduction of expert judgment into informal rulemaking flows from
the agency's freedom to rely on information and opinion outside the compiled
record. When agencies tackle the Gordian knots of economic, environmental, and
energy regulation some reliance on expert judgment is inevitable. Usually the courts
"Frequently, statistics, scientific reports and studies will be
are sympathetic.
amenable to various interpretations and effective regulation requires that the Commission bring to bear the full range of its knowledge, garnered from whatever source
in making the interpretation on which it bases important policy decisions." City of
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
90 The nature of issues proper for resolution by expertise have been described
as the kind "where a month of experienc will be worth a yea of hearings."
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F. 2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966); see Williams, supra note 14, at 408-11.
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soning in judicial review of informal rulemaking. A prominent
example of the judicial impasse in this regard is the profound disagreement among the members of the D.C. Circuit over what "combination of danger signals" 01 indicates that the rulemaking process
has been unreasonable and over what remedy cures which shortcoming. Consider the clash on these points between Judges Leventhai and Bazelon in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus.92
In that case the EPA had denied petitions for a one-year deferral of
the automobile emission standards established under the 1970
Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 93 and the automobile manufacturers appealed to the court. Judge Leventhal, along with Judge
Tamm, concluded that the rulemaking procedures used resulted in
an uncertain record that inhibited meaningful review. Specifically,
the majority felt that the challengers had raised substantial doubts
about the Administrator's reliance on a predictive methodology to
offset the only actual data available which strongly supported the lack
of available technology. 94 The court's dissatisfaction with the record
was two-pronged: (1) a preponderance of the evidence indicated
that the technology was not available, and (2) the reliability of
EPA's methodology was not supported by any reasoned presentation.9 Furthermore, no question of policy was involved because
Congress had made the judgment that suspension of the standard
should turn on the ascertainable facts of technology availability. In
remanding, the court proposed to cure the decisionmaking faults by
affording to the parties a limited right of cross-examination to challenge the evidence and an opportunity to comment on the analysis
and methodology used by the Administrator, which had not been
made available until after the rule was promulgated.96
Chief Judge Bazelon, concurring in the result, was unwilling to
pass on the sufficiency of the factual evidence or methodology. In91
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
92 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9342 U.S.C. § 1857f-(b)(1)(A) (1970).
94The one-year suspension provision depended upon the availability of tech-

nology to meet the standards in 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(A) (1970).
95 478 F.2d at 648-49. Judge Leventhal cast the basis of decision in terms
of an assumed burden of proof.

For a further discussion of this tool of judicial

craftsmanship, see Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 541 (1974).
96 478 F.2d at 649. A similar exercise in remanding for more procedures to
strengthen the evidence and analysis was made by the court in South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (remanding for reconsideration of
some aspects of the Metropolitan Boston Air Quality Transportation Control Plan

where "the objections as to data and methodology seem too serious to . . . simply
pass by." Id. 665).
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stead, he found the court's proper role to be that of guarantor of an
agency's "frame-work for principled decision-making." 97 Eschewing a substantive evaluation almost completely, the Chief Judge
looked, not to the sufficiency of the record, but only at the "critical
character" of the decision. The basis of his decision was the category of the subject matter: "humanity's interest in life, health, and
a harmonious relationship with the elements of nature." 98 His
conclusion was that this special category automatically triggers a
"carefully limited right of cross-examination at the hearing and an
opportunity to challenge the assumptions and methodology underlying the decision." 99 At bottom, this judicial reaction equates
adversary procedures with proper protection of the "'consumers' of
the natural environment." 100 The guiding principle is not accuracy or reasonableness, but suspicion of agency discretion.
Chief Judge Bazelon's concern with agency discretion has been
a recurrent theme in his opinions, especially in reviewing regulations that involve public health and safety. 101 In Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, °0 he described a "new era" in
administrative law "that touches on fundamental personal interests
in life, health, and liberty." 103 Announcing that "[t]hese interests
have always had a special claim to judicial protection," 104 he
opined that the proper control on agency discretion in these special
cases was self-discipline. Administrators were required to enhance
the integrity of the decisionmaking process through the addition
of adversarial devices, thereby diminishing the reviewing court's responsibility to examine the result. 0 5 The attractiveness of this view
for the reviewing court is clear. By imposing extra procedural re97 478 F.2d at 651, quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.).
98 478 F.2d at 651.
99 Id. 652.

100 Id. 651. Chief Judge Bazelon's solicitude toward consumers was similarly
evident in Public Service Commission, see text accompanying notes 58, 79-84, supra.
10, See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Broad
issues of public health and safety may, for example, require an expanded right of
."); Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1032 (D.C.
confrontation ....
Cir. 1973); Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
102 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reviewing the refusal to issue a cancellation and summary suspension order for the registration of DDT).
3.03 Id.

597-98.

104 These special interests are distinguished from "the economic interests at
stake in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding." 439 F.2d 598. Accord, International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
CJ.) ("[We are dealing here not with an airline's fares or a broadcaster's wat-

tage .... ").
105 439 F.2d at 597.
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quirements whenever "special interests" are at stake, the court can
be relieved of the prickly task of sifting through technical data and
complex analysis. At the same time, the court can disavow any
intent to meddle in scientific and technical issues while providing
judicial guardianship over environmental, public, and special interest participants in rulemaking. The potential weakness of this
approach is that it hastily discards the flexibility of rulemaking and
abdicates almost all responsibility for substantive review.
Because of these objections, Chief Judge Bazelon has not been
very successful in convincing his colleagues to unqualifiedly join in
his view. 06 He has provoked sharp rebuttals from Judge Wright 07
and Judge Leventhal. 0 8 Their well-taken arguments are that
purely procedural review and remedy threaten rulemaking paralysis
and narrow the scope of review to an ineffectual rite, contrary to
the intent of the APA and the interpretations of the Supreme Court.
Beyond these points, the special cases analysis makes no distinction
between the discrete parts of administrative decisionmaking. It cuts
against all the elements in the agency's decision with the same blunt
instrument.
10 6National Asphalt Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(McGowan, J., MacKinnon, J.) ("The cases relied on by petitioners do not hold that
hybrid procedures are required in all informal rulemaking proceedings dealing with
environmental issues."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 n.18
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.,Wright, J.,Tamm,J.)("[D.C. Circuit] precedents
establish that in a particular case fairness may require more than the APA minimum,
but are not to be taken as suggesting in any way that the court considers the kind
of problems involved in environment regulations to require more than the written
submissions specified by Congress."); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (1971) (Robb, J., dissenting).
107 Wright, supra note 14, at 388-95; Wright, Court of Appeals Review of
Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 An. L. !Ev. 199, 207 (1974). But see,
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
108 Chief Judge Bazelon has taken this occasion to discourse on his views
. . . as to how an agency should handle the proceedings involving safety
and health.. . . [His] underlying approach, voiced in his separate opinion
in International Harvester, seems to be pointed toward distending the procedural requirements for rule-making proceedings. He seems to be trying
to chart a course whereby cross-examination will become routine in rulemaking proceedings, subject to exceptions for unusual or emergency circumstances. The view developed in the majority opinion in International
Harvester, is that oral presentations in rule-making, however desirable, are
not generally required, and that such requirements as may be evolving
apply to crucial issues where alternative procedures are not adequate.
Friends of the Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.).
For another example of the difference between Bazelon and Leventhal, with particular reference to substantive review of agency decisions, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion by Bazelon, C.J., and
concurring statement by Leventhal, J.).
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C. Remedies for Inadequate Rulemaking
Additionally, a procedural cure may be unsuited for the particular infirmity. Adversarial devices designed to sharpen factual
outlines are not necessary to restrict rational, nonarbitrary administrative discretion to delegated bounds. Erroneous findings of
fact and unreasonable policy judgments require different remedies.
A rule's statement of basis and purpose sets out the reasonableness
of the decision in relation to the statutory license. If the explanation is not sound, there is little reason to believe that extending
cross-examination or discovery to challenging parties will aid the
agency in finding an alternative course. The agency must be free
to act upon the tested facts and rational inferences in light of its
expert judgment alone. The only externally dictated reasoning
that must be included are protections against "unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice." 109 The court cannot probe the
administrator's mind for these assurances. It must rely on the
reasonableness of the explanation. Forming the ultimate decision
and explanation is the sole responsibility of agency officials, either
initially or on remand.
In order to fashion a remedy suitable for the inadequacy of a
particular rulemaking, the court must carefully catalogue the contested issues according to their fact, methodology, and policy constituents. This analysis could be impossible without detailed clarification by the agency and will no doubt give rise to disagreements
over the proper categorization of some issues. The room for error
in this interplay between agency and court, however, is much
preferable to an undifferentiated review and monolithic procedural
remedy.
For the most difficult mixes of fact and policy, a court could
make the studied decision that the potential for full disclosure of
the true basis of a rule is better with some adversity in the procedures and, consequently, discount the policy elements involved.
It should do so only after careful consideration of the agency's explanation of basis and purpose, elaborated on after the areas of
judicial concern are identified if necessary. This approach would
preserve the court's guardianship role and make some provision for
the agency to exercise its legislative adaptability. 1 0
109

Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.

1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
10
3 On the other hand, if the policy judgment cannot fairly be described as
within the range of discretion allowed by Congress the court would be clearly
justified in disallowing it.
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Before prescribing extra procedures for refining the factual
component of a mixed issue a court should assess the genuineness
of the opportunity to make a presentation afforded by the original
procedures and the significance of the factual dispute. Only where
the new procedures promise to yield substantially better results than
the original ones, and where the factual dispute is of importance to
the outcome of the rulemaking as a whole, should the prescription
be made.
When examining a mixed fact and policy rulemaking, a reviewing court cannot rely solely on its own impressions of substantive
merit, nor can it abstractly evaluate the adequacy of the participatory procedures provided. A satisfactory method for walking the
tightrope between substantive interference and procedural overbearance is the following three-part test. First, with the mandatory
assistance of the expert agency, the contested issues are categorized
by their major element: fact, methodology, or policy. Second, decisionmaking inadequacies are remedied appropriately. Issues that
are policy dominant are remanded, without procedural dictates, for
a fuller record. If the controlling aspect of the issue is found to be
fact or methodology, a procedural remedy is appropriate if, third,
two threshold criteria are met: a particular extra procedure must be
shown to be more conducive to full disclosure than the original
procedures, and the court must judge that the outcome of the rulemaking will be arguably affected by the additional evidence adduced
in extra proceedings. This mode of analysis affords two benefits.
It respects an agency's policy functioning so that difficult nonfactual problems can be imaginatively and responsibly addressed.
It also separates out and focuses on those facts which require
extraordinary ventilation before the appropriate audience, without
wasting time and energy on those issues satisfactorily disposed of
by the normal procedures.
Careful differentiation between the component parts of mixed
fact and policy decisionmaking is extremely important when the
issue to be decided is both controversial and perplexing. Among
the contemporary legislative attempts to grapple with the problems
of technology, perhaps none is as controversial and perplexing as
NEPA. Consequently, before the full ramifications of joining
hybrid rulemaking with the arcane science of environmental impacts
can be assessed, several unique complexities intrinsic in NEPA
should be understood.
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II. NEPA AND RULEMAKING
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 has been
aptly compared to a constitutional charter.11 The Act's lofty
declaration of general substantive policy and its fragmentary implementation procedures leave all of the details to be filled in by subsequent interpretation and application. 112 The broad substantive
policy declaration of section 101 reflects a congressional intent to
alter the governmental priorities with regard to environmental
values."13 This imprecise statement of intent to mandate genuine
substantive change is coupled with administrative procedures aimed
at bringing about that change. The so-called "action forcing" provisions of section 102 impose on all federal agencies the duty to
interpret and administer, "to the fullest extent possible," the
"policies, regulations and public laws of the United States .

. in

accordance with the policies set forth in this [Act]." 1:4 Most of the
efforts by federal agencies to implement NEPA's dictates have been
directed at complying with the section 102(2)(c) requirement of a
detailed statement for all governmental activities "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 115 The environmental impact statement (EIS) has been the major vehicle of ad111 Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal
Bureaucracy, 71 MicH. L. BEv. 511, 512. See also Hanks & Hanks, An Environ-

mental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 230, 244-72 (1970); Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmental Magna Carta or Agency
Coup de Grace? 72 COLUm. L. REv. 963 (1972).
112 Crampton & Berg, supra note 97, at 512-513.

113 Section 101(b) provides six goals for federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;

(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3)

attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without

degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which

supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will

permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. §4331(b) (1970).
114 Id. § 4332(1).
115 Id. § 4332(2) (C).
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ministrative decisionmaking reform and the best hope for realizing
NEPA's substantive policy mandate.'16
Ordinarily the issues addressed by agencies in NEPA environmental statements have arisen in the context of particular cases.
For example, environmental impact statements must detail the
specific environmental effects to be expected by the construction
of a dam or a segment of interstate highway. In areas of increasing
technological complexity, however, individualized consideration of
recurrent issues of environmental impact is inefficient and highly
burdensome, especially for issues involving mixed questions of fact
and policy. Agencies frequently turn to rulemaking to resolve
repetitive problems. Rulemaking is also attractive in this context
because it offers enhanced flexibility in integrating NEPA with an
agency's mission-oriented procedures." 7
Judicial review of NEPA rulemaking must gauge the extent to
which the Act's procedural mandate of administrative reform and
its substantive mandate to factor environmental values into agency
decisions have been met.
A. Administrative Reform
NEPA was enacted primarily to correct the absence of environmental sensitivity in the federal bureaucracy." 8 The strategy of the
116 See Andrews, NEPA in Practice: Environmental Policy or Administrative
Reform?, 6 ELR 50001 (1976).
117 See Miller, Anderson, & Liroff, The National Environmental Policy Act and
Agency Policy Making: Neither Paper Tiger Nor Straightiacket, 6 ELR 50020
(1976).
Efficiency and flexibility led the Commission to rulemaking for evaluating the
environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle-an issue that arises in every nuclear
power plant licensing proceeding. For a detailed description of nuclear power
plant licensing and the benefits of rulemaking to that process, see Note, The Use
of Generic Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing, 61 VA. L. REv. 869 (1975). The Commission's purpose in the uranium
fuel cycle rulemaking was to examine closely one portion of the virtually boundless
range of considerations conceivably relevant to an environmental review of a nuclear
power plant and to produce a focused, reasonably documented, and manageable aid
to decisionmaking. See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 37 Fed. Beg. 24,191 (1972). The Commission's objective
was a laudable one. See Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statements, An Analysis of Six Years Experience by Seventy Federal
Agencies (March 1976) at 52-53.
118 Senator Jackson, NEPA's principal sponsor, succinctly described the need
for bureaucratic reform in comments introducing the bill that became NEPA:
Our present governmental institutions are not designed to deal in a comprehensive manner with problems involving the quality of our surroundings
and man's relationship to the environment. The responsibilities and functions of government institutions as presently organized are extremely
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statute is to require federal decisionmakers to increase the scope
of information they must consider before reaching any decision
affecting the environment. The choice of this strategy is in sharp
contrast to the traditional solution for bureaucratic problemsstructural reorganization. In one legislative stroke, NEPA made
"environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal
agency." 119 How this vague, administrative reform was to be
realized, however, was unclear until the courts were called upon to
set the standards for complying with the procedures of section 102.
The first court to extensively examine the procedural changes
in agency decisionmaking anticipated by NEPA was the D.C. Circuit in Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC. 20 At issue
were certain Atomic Energy Commission regulations implementing
NEPA. Judge Wright, speaking for a unanimous court, found that
the Commission's regulations failed to "consider" environmental
impacts in sufficient detail or depth. The court interpreted section
102 to intend a "particular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process" under a strict standard of procedural compliance
vigorously enforced by the courts. 121 Judge Wright detailed the
exact parameters necessary in a formula for informed decisionmaking:
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the
part of federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular economic and technical benefits of planned action
must be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which would
affect the balance of values . . . The point of the indi-

vidualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with
fractionated. .

. This organization reflects our early national goals of
resources exploitation, economic development, and conquest.

Our national goals have, however, changed a great deal in recent
years. Today Government organization does not reflect this change in objectives and the new demands which are being placed on the environment.

115 Cong. Rec. 3699 (1969); noted in Comment, The National Environmental Policy
Act Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 799, 805 n.23 (1973).
See generally, Caldwell, A SPECIAL REPoRT To ThE SENATE Comm. ON BnEor
AND INsuLAR AFFAIs, A NATIONAL Poucv FOR THE ENVmoNMENT 8, 90th Cong.
2d Sess. (Comm. print July 11, 1968), noted in F. ANDERsoN, NEPA Dn THE
CotmTs: A LEGAL ANALYsis OF TE NATIONAL ENviom-rrAL Porcy ACT 202

(1973).
1 19

Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
120d.
121 Id.

1114-15.
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possible alterations,
the optimally beneficial action is
122
finally taken.
The optimization expected by Judge Wright is a means, not an end.
This conclusion is clear from the passage in which he distinguishes
the standards applicable to substantive and procedural review of
agency decisionmaking:
The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be
shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that
was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight
to environmental values. But if the decision was reached
procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in
good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to
123
reverse.
The interpretation that optimization is achieved by adequate
procedures and is not a substantive test guaranteeing the "right" result is reinforced by Judge Wright's discussion of the dual functions
served by section 102(2)(c). First, the detailed statement is expected
to inform other interested agencies and the public of the environmental consequences of the proposed action. Secondly, the description of alternatives ensures that the decisionmaker considers all
factors that might change the environmental impacts or the balance
struck.J2 4 Judicial enforcement of NEPA's administrative reform
could be assured, the court reasoned, by close scrutiny of how the
agency exposed information on environmental risk to those outside
the agency and the manner in which the agency used that information in the decisionmaking process.
This judicial construction of NEPA as, in effect, an "environmental full disclosure law" 125 has been the most effective method of
bringing about a conscientious change in federal agency attitudes
toward the environment.' 2 Under this construction NEPA opens
:122 Id. 1123.
123

Id. 1115.

Id. 1114. Judge Wright repeated this construction of NEPA objectives in
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
125 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728,
759 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
120 The objective of full disclosure is now universally guarded by the courts.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th
Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
124
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up the agency decisionmaking process and subjects it to critical
evaluation by other agencies with differing priorities and expertise,
by the Congress, and by the interested public. Exposure of the
environmental consequences of a particular agency's action to the
nation's decisionmakers and others creates external political pressures on the agency to alter its course so as to minimize these consequences, and thus effectuates NEPA's objective of superimposing
environmental protection policy and procedures on already existing
decisionmaking structures designed to carry out other missions.
A court that undertakes to enforce the NEPA procedural mandate of full disclosure should be cognizant of the implications that
the analysis presented in the preceding section has for NEPA
decisionmaking. Of crucial importance is an understanding of the
policy dimension of the agency's task in resolving NEPA issues.
NEPA calls upon the agency to include an additional environmental parameter into its multivariable deliberations. The limitation on agency compliance is the finite elasticity of bureaucratic
decisionmaking. 127 Most complex agency decisions are made by
comparing the relative importance of various factors against policy
guidance provided by Congress, usually in the agency's organic
statute. In the easy case, where Congress has articulated a definite
ordering of priorities, the agency's role is reduced to that of collecting sufficient facts in order to relegate the issue before it into
the congressionally preordained pigeonhole.128 The interaction of
NEPA and a given agency's organic statute, however, does not
present the easy case. There is an obvious limit to the number
of conflicting priorities any agency can juggle without an explicit
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.
1974).
Professor Andrews strongly maintains that the true success of NEPA is the
opening of new channels of information and input for concerned individuals who
generate the political pressure-including the threat of court challenges-that creates
the incentive necessary for administrators to conscientiously consider the environmental impacts of their decisions. Andrews, supra note 116, at 50004-06; Andrews,
Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications, 16 NAT. REsourcts J.
301 (1976).
127For an especially insightful analysis of the institutional limits of agency
decisionmaking with particular reference to the Calvert Cliffs' holding that alternatives be considered and environmental costs be balanced against project benefits,
see Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerationsand Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 Imw. L.J. 645
(1972); Cramton & Berg, supra note 97, at 527-34.
128 Consider in this connection the example discussed in the text accompanying
note 65 supra concerning the banning of hazardous substances. If Congress were
able to fashion in advance precise standards of hazardousness, the normative
dimension of an administrator's decision to ban a given substance would be significantly reduced, and the decision could more readily be characterized as a
"factfinding" as to the existence of a congressionally condemned hazard.
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source of reference. Adding NEPA's general, ill-defined environmental mandate to existing agency missions does nothing to resolve
the competition among inconsistent objectives. 1 29 In these circumstances, agency decisionmaking involes uncertainties that cannot be
resolved without compromising one kind of value or another. The
policy, not the factual character, of such decisionmaking is clearly
dominant. The acceptability of these policy compromises must be
tested by the public and the executive and legislative branches of
the government in the political crucible. This testing requires that
administrators fully and honestly disclose the competing values
among which a compromise has been made, the possible alternative
balances of these values, and the reasons for adoption of the chosen
balance. The analysis of the preceding section suggests that judicial
intervention into this process of full disclosure of an agency's policy
choices should be limited to remanding to the agency for more
complete justification those decisions whose bases have been inadequately revealed. The analysis clearly denies the usefulness, in
these circumstances, of judicial remand for the introduction of
adversary procedures into the decisionmaking process. 130
Although NEPA issues are most likely to be policy dominant in
character, the courts also have a role in policing an agency's disclosure of environmental facts and of methodology employed. Because the courts are restrained by the constitution from substituting
their judgment of the merits for that of the agency, they should
limit their concern to "evidence that the mandated decision making
process has in fact taken place." 131 Courts can guarantee adequate
consideration of environmental facts by requiring "a framework for
principled decision making." 132 The integrity of the decisional
process, not the decisional product itself, is the subject of scrutiny
when a reviewing court examines the sufficiency of a statement of
impacts or exposition of alternatives. The judiciary can be satisfied
that federal agencies have honestly integrated NEPA into the existing decisionmaking procedures if the environmental record reveals
a reasonably detailed, substantiated, and candid disclosure of the
129 A prime example of priority inconsistency is the conflict between preserving
the environment and making new energy sources available. See generally, Busterud,

Energy Policy and the Environment, 54 ORE. L. REv. 503 (1975).
0
13 For further discussion of this point, see the text accompanying notes 193-95
infra.

131 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
132 Scientists' Inst. For Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), noting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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environmental costs associated with the proposal. Any test attempting to exact more substantial proof of good faith compliance will
pass into second-guessing the agency decision.133 Although policing
the disclosure of environmental costs does effectuate NEPA's administrative reform, the need for complete disclosure must also be
balanced against the desirability of agency freedom to allocate time
and energy in the face of resource limitations. NEPA is aimed at
basic rethinking of environmental goals, but it does not anticipate
any search for perfection. A district court reviewing a Corps of
Engineers navigation project described the lesser objective:
If perfection were the standard, compliance would necessitate the accumulation of the sum total of scientific knowledge of the environmental elements affected by a proposal.
It is unreasonable to impute to the Congress such an edict.
[But] the phrase "to the fullest extent possible"
clearly imposes a standard of environmental management
requiring nothing less than comprehensive and objective
treatment by the responsible agency.134
A reviewing court must have some confirmation that the administrative decisionmaker has objectively evaluated all environmental
factors. 35 The court should not, however, interject itself into a
NEPA decision if the responsible officials produce convincing evidence that they took a "hard look" at environmental consequences. 3
Where such a "hard look" is in evidence, and in view of the practical time and resource limitations upon an agency, courts should
eschew remanding agency decisions for more exhaustive factual inquiries into environmental impact and certainly should not require
the utilization of costly, time-consuming adversarial procedures.137
'33 See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th
Cir. 1973).
184 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916,
927 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
185 The best evidence of reasoned decisionmaking in NEPA cases is a reasoned
statement of the ultimate choices made that draws from substantial support in the
record and that understandably delineates the environmental effects known and
unknown. The importance of such a statement has been repeatedly emphasized
by the courts. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 10941095 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehke, 473 F.2d
346, 350-351 (8th Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
6
'I Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838
(D.C. Cir. 1972). The "hard look" test is functionally equivalent to good faith
individualized consideration. See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. For Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC,
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froelke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
137 See text accompanying notes 193-95 infra.
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NEPA's administrative reform, therefore, is identified much
more closely with the disclosure of environmental consequences and
explanation of choices made-for review by the public, the Congress,
the Executive, and the courts-than with the merits of any particular result. Again this conclusion is not at all surprising considering that, as noted above, environmental decisions are based far
less in factual determinations than in inchoate value judgments.
One other limitation on NEPA's decisionmaking reform bears
directly on all federal agencies. Although administrators may
demonstrate good faith objectivity by conscientious analysis, proof
of subjective impartiality is beyond reasonable expectation. In
contrast to factual determinations, which are susceptible to the
requirement of objectivity, NEPA decisionmaking necessarily involves subjectivity insofar as it is unavoidably normative in character. This predominantly normative character of NEPA decisionmaking has been seen to stem from the Act's failure to provide a
determinate priority ordering of conflicing social goals. Because an
agency's basic mission remains unchanged, considering NEPA
values can result in institutional schizophrenia. Understandably,
if an agency's primary purpose is building dams, or regulating
nuclear power plants, it will be inclined to accept the desirability
of continuing commitments to those programs. NEPA is not intended to totally reshape mission orientation into an environmentalist mold. It is a mechanism for broadening the bureaucracy's
narrow, insensitive approach to decisionmaking. 38 In response to
these realizations, the courts have not required agency officials to
prove subjective impartiality. Rather, the inevitability of an institutional bias is accepted as adequately compensated for by the
procedural requirements of section 102-when vigorously enforced. 139
As long as "there is no way [the decisionmaker] can fail to note the
facts and understand the very serious arguments advanced by
[participants]," institutional bias is not an encumbrance in complying with NEPA. 140 Overcoming agency bias-as well as fusing
188 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froelke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex.), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 759 (E.D.
Ark. 1971), affd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973)
("The Congress by enacting NEPA, may not have intended to alter the then existing
decisionmaking responsibilities or to take away any then existing freedom of decisionmaking, but it certainly intended to make such decisionmaking more responsive
and more responsible.").
'39 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
140 Id. 295, quoting the district court opinion, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (E.D.
Ark. 1972).
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NEPA values into the decisional methods-is left to the indirect
pressures on the responsible executive who examines the environmental benefits and detriments and publicly announces his decision.141 The strength of these forces is assured by judicial review
of the statements to see that they provide "a record upon which a
decisionmaker could arrive at an informed decision." 142
B. Substantive Policy Mandate
While a federal agency can evidence procedural reform by
candidly disclosing the environmental impact of its choices, the
question remains whether the substantive decisions made must show
some minimum regard for the policy mandate contained in section
101 of NEPA. Does NEPA prescribe some identifiable quantum
of deference to environmental preservation that cannot be balanced
away? What is the role of the courts in enforcing compliance beyond procedural requisites? Such questions have received much
attention from the courts and commentators. The majority answer
endorses a function for the judiciary in overseeing the substantive
implications of NEPA.143 The nature of substantive review of
agency decisionmaking may be described in terms of the standard
of review on the one hand and the degree of leniency allowed in the
application of such a standard, in view of the imponderables
inherent in the agencies' task, on the other.
With regard to the standard of review, the courts have unanimously settled on the standard found in Citizens to Preserve Over141 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973). The most common implication
of institutional bias is an agency's commitment to and investment in a project or
program prior to the enactment of NEPA. The courts have recognized that it is
impracticable, if not impossible, for an agency to totally re-examine a tortuously
evolved course of action when a significant investment of time, money, and foregone

alternatives has been made, often as a result of prior governmental policy choices.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123
(5th Cir. 1974). The Council on Environmental Quality (created by Title III of

NEPA) has provided general guidance for circumstances of impracticability:
11. Application of section 102(2)(C) procedure to existing projects and
programs. . . . Where it is not practicable to reassess the basic course of
action, it is still important that further incremental major actions be shaped
so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences. It is also important
in further action that account be taken of environmental consequences not
fully evaluated at the outset of the project or program.
Guidelines For Federal Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 36
Fed. Reg. 7,724, 7,727 (1971).
142 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211,

1217 (E.D. Ark.), aft'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
931 (1973).
143

E.g., Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach To Substantive Review

Under NEPA, 88 HAuv. L. Rxv. 735 (1975) and sources cited therein at n.2.
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ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 44 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA 145 to the
Secretary of Transportation's approval of federal funds to build
a highway through public parkland. The Court required that a
"searching and careful inquiry" be made into the facts supporting
148
the Secretary's finding that statutory preconditions had been met.
In making that determination, however, the Court further explained that the standard is a narrow one: "The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." 147 In
NEPA cases this standard translates, in the language of Calvert
Cliffs', into the question whether "the actual balance of costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental values." 148
It would be more reassuring to have concrete guidelines on
what separates careful scrutiny from substitution of judgment, but
the concept is necessarily more fluid than definitive. The court, as
"senior partner" in the enterprise, 149 is obliged to leave the ultimate
resolution of competing scientific opinion and differing data bases
to the agency decisionmakers. 150 The agency in turn is required
to set forth in detail why the policy emphasis in NEPA should not
prevail.
How judicial application of the standard of substantive review
articulated without elaboration in Calvert Cliffs' is to differ as a
practical matter from procedural review-described in some detail
in Calvert Cliffs-is certainly not clear.151 The best suggestion is
that substantive review is a description of judicial attitude instead
of judicial mechanics. Unable to find any quantifiable element in
144 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

See note 44 supra.
14 6 The Secretary could approve funds only if (1 )"there is no feasible and

145

prudent alternative to the use of such land," Department of Transportation Act of

1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)

(1970), and (2) "such program includes all possible

planning to minimize harm to such park . . . resulting from such use."

Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
147 401 U.S. at 416.
148449 F.2d at 115. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953
(7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
149 Friendly, Some Kind Of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1311 n.221

(1975).
150 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froelke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240-41
(W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Callaway,

497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974).
15 1 See text accompanying notes 120-24 supra.
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the congressional policy statement-because none exists-the courts
have turned to a qualitative alternative. The goals enumerated in
section 101 are broad and idealistic and, therefore, are a suitable
tool for judicial activism. Substantive review may not be a test as
much as a starting point. Federal agency programs and projects at
odds with environmental preservation are placed by the activist
court into an evidentiary hole. The depth of the hole is probably
determined by the seriousness of environmentalists' objections.
Agency officials must climb out before they can begin to build a
case showing that NEPA's substantive goal has been reached.
Recognizing the bureaucracy's previous poor environmental
track record and the limited potential for NEPA to affect substance
through procedures, 1 2 it is appropriate that the courts give environmental values a sympathetic boost. NEPA is designed to make a
great deal of administrative action-formerly entirely free of environmental concern-reviewable against a new standard. The force
of judicial activism, however, must be tempered with a full understanding of the institutional limitations on the most exacting NEPA
duty: balancing less environmentally detrimental alternatives against
the proposed action.153
The danger in forcing agencies to consider an unbounded range
of alternative solutions-involving a limitless mix of policy choices
and implementation strategies-is overtaxing management capabilities. A complete analysis of every appropriate alternative might
have to include the possibility of national priority reordering or of
total program reform. Expecting years of incremental decisionmaking to be undone by one agency of limited jurisdiction and
expertise is unrealistic and may be counter-productive. Excessive
judicial emphasis on comprehensive consideration of alternatives
may force the agency to treat the statement of alternatives as a court
exhibit. The agency will thus be discouraged from candidly discussing the policy framework that dictates the range of manageable alternatives within the agency's control and from suggesting
what policy restructuring might open up other alternatives. Instead, the agency will try to satisfy the courts' preference for data,
152 For a most critical look at the promise of NEPA reform, see Sax, -The
(Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OMA.L. Bxv. 239 (1973).
153A full analysis of the implications is left to others but an appreciation of
what can be realistically expected is essential in assessing the success of adminis-

trative innovations integrating mission procedures and NEPA. See Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accommodation, 3 EcoL. L.Q. 705 (1973); Zimmerman, Alternatives to Proposed Actions Under NEPA: The AEC Response After
Calvert Cliffs', 14 ATOMIC ENFRGY L.J. 265 (1973); Tarlock, supra note 116;
cramton & Berg, supra note 111; Murphy, supra note 111.
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tables, and charts demonstrating that the "optimally beneficial
action" was proposed. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that agencies channel their finite resources into project justifications.1 54 A defensive posture is the agencies' only recourse as long
as the judiciary fails to recognize that selection between alternatives
is possible only if their relative merit can be ranked. Ranking in
turn requires a valid priority ordering and quantifiable values. If
either element is appreciably absent, the comparison of alternatives
is only a facile word exercise, and in the NEPA context the first is
significantly lacking.
As a consequence of the lack of priority ordering, the factual
appearance of NEPA cost-benefit determinations acts as a disguise
for difficult agency policy judgments. One example of the need for
systematic ordering of priorities will serve to demonstrate its significance for purposes of the analysis undertaken here. Meeting
energy needs by the use of nuclear power involves unavoidable
costs-environmental sacrifices, risk of accidents, resource exploitation. Balancing the cost against the benefit produces a rough ratio
of social worth. The term ratio must be used advisedly because
most of the environmental costs and some of the benefits clearly
cannot be expressed as integers. A cost-benefit ratio, then, is no
more than a comparative value judgment disguised as a mathematical conclusion.L5 Building on this analytical fiction, the project
cost-benefit ratio is the baseline for comparison with all alternatives.
The inability of nuclear power plant opponents to prove that
either fossil-fueled plants or delay awaiting new power sources is a
superior choice leaves only the comparison between building the
plant or abandoning the project altogether-are the benefits of the
project sufficiently in excess of the costs? Who is to say that satisfying the assumed need for electricity outweighs the cost and on
what evidence? Should the NRC control energy supply by restricting the issuance of licenses on some strict standard of necessity and
thereby cut back on energy demand? What new level of demand
below the present high energy consumption produces the optimum
mix of reduced risk; scarce resource allocation, unemployment and
economic growth? These are the underlying policy tensions abstractly represented by the numerical ratios and resolution of these
tensions is ultimately a matter of politics, not science. A federal
agency trying to resolve even a small portion of these tensions looks
154 See

Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. REsocnoEs J. 323, 335-36 (1976).
25 5 See Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 STAr. L. BEv. 1092 (1972).
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to the legislature for some ordering principle. Where Congress has,
as in the case of NEPA, failed to give the agency the aid of a determinate ordering, substantive judicial review should be accordingly lenient.
The courts have been willing to relax the standards of "proof"
when the legislature has clearly intended that the risk of harm be a
sufficient predicate for protective regulations. 156 There is no apparent reason to take a different view when the legislature has refused to reconcile competing social values, such as environmental
risk and expanding energy' capacity. Resolving the unavoidable
policy conflicts is left by default to the agencies. These bodies are
more expert than Congress, which may partially explain the legislature's inactivity. In any event, the judiciary is not at liberty to
indirectly require policy reconciliations by imposing standards of
proof that agencies cannot meet.1 57 In the NEPA context, it may
be argued that most non-environmental agencies cannot shelter their
risk assessments under the guise of expertise. 58 This skeptical approach ignores NEPA's purposeful introduction of environmental
professionals into agency staffs and environmental factors into the
decisional equation in general. Officials of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission may not be geologists or ecologists, but it is their responsibility-not the courts-to assess the evidence of the true experts
and to make the appropriate speculations. Furthermore, the reserved area of scientific uncertainty can be identified sufficiently,
even to generalist judges, to prevent free roaming agency abuse.
IV. SPECIAL PROCEDURAL DEVICES FOR

NEPA

RULEMIAKING:

NRDC v. NRC
The NEPA draftsmen contemplated that environmental values
would be protected by early comprehensive planning of federal
activities. NEPA was specifically designed to break the incremental
decision chain that too often results in irreversible commitments
with unexpected effects on the environment. 59 Project by project
investigations are often too narrow in scope or undertaken too late
6
' 5 Casenote, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 178 (1975).
57
1
For a discussion of why adversarial procedures also need not, as a rule,
be imposed by the judiciary in order to fulfill NEPA's substantive mandate, see
the text accompanying notes 196-97 infra.

158 See Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ELR 50001, 50011
(1973); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 509, 523-524 (1974).
'59

547 F.2d at 640-41, quoting from S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 5

(1969); see generally ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CounTs 1-14 (1973).
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to fulfill this design. Broad programmatic proceedings, on the other
hand, are an effective means towards maximizing the timely consideration of all environmental factors. They are particularly suited
for the consideration of the cumulative or synergistic environmental
impacts of long range federal activities. 160
Rulemaking, therefore, offers the most appropriate procedure
for agencies to examine future programs and policies in the NEPA
context. The rulemaking blend of fact-finding accuracy and legislative flexibility is distinctly suited for planning that must balance
anticipated project benefits against possible detriments to the environment. Such planning must be done early enough so that important options are not inadvertently foreclosed, but not so early
that the absence of experience or testing invalidates its practical
usefulness. Better environmental decisions are possible if agencies
are encouraged to expand the use of early rulemaking for planning
their activities and forecasting the environmental results.
In order to encourage agency use of rulemaking under NEPA,
a maximum amount of freedom should be left to an agency to
institute participatory procedural innovations beyond the minimum
required by its organic statute and the APA. Agency officials are
in the best position to counterbalance the benefits of increased
public participation against the burdens of over-formalized proceedings. The potential for gaining political acceptance of controversial decisions by opening up the decisionmaking process to
the public is neither unrecognized nor unwelcomed by administrators.'(' But neither are they ignorant of the ulterior motives
of some participants who find delay of official action enough of a
victory. The rapid adoption and ultimate success of NEPA rulemaking, therefore, will be best assured by allowing federal agencies
the latitude to formulate their own prescriptions for fairness,
efficiency and accuracy.
The task for a court in reviewing NEPA rulemaking is a very
delicate one. Without stifling the agency's initiative the court must
insure that the rulemaking meets the particularized due process
standards and implements NEPA's procedural and substantive
160 The Supreme Court announced in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976), that the "cumulative or synergistic" environmental impacts of federal programs and practical considerations of feasibility are significant factors in determin-

ing when programmatic environmental impact statements are required. Id. 410.
The desirability of programmatic statements for environmental planning is discussed
in Miller, Anderson, and Liroff, supra note 117.
161 See, e.g., Remarks by Marcus A. Rowden, Chairman, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, before The International Symposium on the Management
of Wastes from the LWR Cycle, Denver, Colorado (July 12, 1976).
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mandates. At the same time, the reviewing court must be wary
of the analytical difficulties involved: the hybrid-rulemaking doctrine has many ill-defined edges and the sketchy NEPA charter is
equally ambiguous. The review of innovative proceedings combining the complexities of rulemaking and NEPA decisionmaking
thus requires a careful conceptualization of the standards to be met.
Unfortunately the analysis provided by the first court to authoritatively address NEPA rulemaking is inadequate in significant respects. Indeed, a crucial error is made by the majority opinion in
NRDC v. NRC in characterizing as factual, issues essentially policy
in nature. From this initial error the majority proceeds to further
err by inappropriately prescribing adversarial procedures as the
means to remedy an admittedly inadequate rulemaking record.
162
The opinion of the court, written by Chief Judge Bazelon,
held that given what was characterized as an inadequately developed
"factual" record '16 it was arbitrary and capricious of the Commission to treat the environmental effects of fuel reprocessing and
waste disposal as relatively insignificant for purposes of the licensing
of nuclear reactors. Judge Tamm endorsed this finding and joined
in the remand of the waste disposal portion of the rule for supplemental evidence showing that a hard look was taken at that issue.
The majority and concurring opinions fundamentally disagreed,
however, on the focus of the court's inquiry and on the remedial
disposition. The judges agreed that the record generated was incomplete. 16 4 The controversial question was whether procedures
162 Chief Judge Bazelon was joined in the opinion by Judge Edwards of the
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

163The

court indicated in detail the record inadequacies relating to waste

disposal. The court did not, however, explain what inadequacies existed with
respect to the record on reprocessing. The only discussion of that subject was three
insertions of the term "reprocessing" in the majority opinion. 547 F.2d at 647, 654,
655. Consequently, the remainder of this discussion will be concerned only with
the waste disposal issue.
The primary environmental concern associated with nuclear waste is the
presence of highly toxic radioisotopes. Many of these radioisotopes are extremely
long-lived. Plutonium, for example, will decay to half its radioactive content in
approximately 24,000 years. As a result of their continuing high toxicity, some
constituents of nuclear waste must be isolated from the biosphere for extremely
long periods of time. See generally, ENERGY REsEARcH AND DEvELopEmrr ADmiNISTRATION,

ALTERNATIVES

FOR MANAGING

WASTES

FROM

REACTORS

AND

Posr-

FISSION OPEnATIONS iN TnE LWR FUEL CYCzE (ERDA-76-43 1976).
The actual length of isolation necessary and the quantity of risk associated with
disposal of radioactive wastes are subjects of great debate within the scientific community. Compare Harwood, May, Resniloff, Schlenger, and Tames, Activation
Products in a Nuclear Reactor (NYPIRG, Inc. Report 1975) with R. Lapp, RAD OPRoBLEM Cr-mr (1976).
ACTrvE WASTES: Socar's
164 The Commission undeniably faired poorly on this score. The only support
for the conclusions reached on waste disposal was a general statement delivered
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of a more adversarial nature were necessary to "flesh out" the
record. The prior case law demonstrates that the necessity of extra
procedures depends upon the logical nexus between those procedures and identified procedural unfairness, or the requirements
of judicial review. 65
An examination of the majority discussion of the procedural
unfairness that could only be cured by adversarial devices reveals
an unexpected emphasis on generalities. The majority readily
embraced the challengers' broad argument that denial of discovery
and cross-examination denied them a meaningful opportunity to
participate. Essentially reversing the International Harvester
preference for "circumscribed and justified" requests on specific
issues, the court evaluated in the abstract the "aggregate" adequacy
of the Commission's procedures.:"6 In so doing, it was admitted
that the challengers did not even attempt to show issues that could
not be explored except through the claimed right of cross-examination. 6 7 The majority evaded this inconsistency with precedent by
the non sequitur that some issues could be properly "ventilated" by
adequate discovery.168 What the majority opinion omits, however,
is a single reasoned statement explaining why the existing procedures were unfair or how any extra procedure would work to significantly improve the record the second time around. Chief Judge
Bazlelon did not focus on the specifics of procedural fairness at all,
or on specific facts that required procedural testing.
The majority opinion did adopt the new and diffuse position
that the general comments proffered by the challengers were sufficient to alert the Commission that the waste disposal issue was a
"soft and sensitive subject." 169 This reference to International
Harvester only begins the inquiry, however. Identification of a
critical subject is one element of procedural fairness analysis, but
the threshold finding has always been a showing that the agency's
choice of procedures cannot suffice on remand. In no prior instance
has a challenge on procedural fairness grounds succeeded without
particularized proof by the challenger that a full and true disclosure
during the oral hearing by the Director of the Division of Waste Management and
Transportation. This statement became part of a technical supplement which revised
the original Environmental Survey. UNrrED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMIssIoN,
EN-vmoNMENTAL SunvzY oF m UAN&ru FUEL CYcr (1974).
165 See text accompanying notes 23-60 supra.
166 547 F.2d at 643 n.25.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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of the facts was impossible under the existing procedures. 7 0 Here
the majority opinion makes no serious effort to specifically draw the
connection between the inadequate record and securing the challenger's right to effective participation. All parties to the rulemaking had an opportunity to participate in legislative-type
proceedings 71 - and an opportunity to file written post-hearing
rebuttals-all beyond the statutory requisites of informal rulemaking. When the Uranium Fuel Cycle rule was promulgated, the
Commission commented on its perceptions of procedural fairness:
All parties were fully heard. Nothing offered was excluded. The record does not indicate that any evidentiary
material would have been received under different procedures. Nor did the proponent of the strict "adjudicatory" approach make an offer of proof-or, even remotely
suggest-what substantive matters it would develop under
difference [sic] procedures.1 7 2
The court reached the opposite conclusion by the unexplained
process of "immers[ing] itself in the record" and finding that "a
real give and take" was not fostered on the central issues. 73 The
decision to relieve a dissatisfied rulemaking participant of his obligation to demonstrate that the procedures used are per se unfair,
however, would certainly require something more than these generalities. In an exceptional case, a reviewing court can supply the
reasoned justification on its own findings. 17 Here, however, the
majority inexplicably concluded that the unreliable, abbreviated
statement of basis and purpose was proof enough that a "genuine
dialogue" should be stimulated by special procedural devices.
Perhaps the majority's conclusion was that the requirements of
judicial review dictated the use of extra hybrid procedures in a new
170

Notes 39-40 & accompanying text supra.

Questioning of the participants was done by the Hearing Board in a method
very similar to the procedure highly endorsed by the court in InternationalHarvester.
The only difference between the two instances appears to be the Court's conception
of how vigorously the Board members pursued their questioning.
In response to a Commission motion to correct the opinion, the court deleted
the majority opinion's three emphatic but erroneous assertions that the Hearing
Board did not question the staff expert witness on waste management. Order Correcting Opinion in NRDC v. NRC, No. 74-1586 (D.C. Cir. October 8, 1976) (per
171

curiam).
17239

Fed. Reg. 14,189 (1974).

173 547

F.2d at 644-45.

Cf. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665-67 (1st Cir. 1974).
The court there remanded for further proceeding even though the petitioners had
done little or nothing in attempting to cure the record inadequacies by the procedures provided. The court did not require additional procedures to address the
new issues, however.
174
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rulemaking notwithstanding that the original rulemaking satisfied
the requirements of procedural fairness. As discussed above, 175 the
nature of judicial review varies, depending upon which part of the
decisionmaking framework is under scrutiny. Any judicial conclusion on the desirability of burdensome adversarial procedures should
carefully distinguish between what are genuinely disputed facts and
what are policy controversies. Because many of the questions encountered in NEPA rulemaking involve complex mixtures of fact
and policy, the difference can be difficult to discern. Agency and
court must work harmoniously to identify the specifics in factual
predicate or methodology arguably amenable to sharpening by adversarial steps, while protecting the legsilative function from unnecessary encumbrances. The difficulty of the task is demonstrated
in this case.
The substantive arguments raised by petitioners and agreed to
by the majority do have the appearance of disputes over fact and
methodology. The majority opinion listed the three "more general
comments" that is considered sufficient to demonstrate the lack of
"thorough explanation" and "a meaningful opportunity to challenge" the agency's judgments: NRDC urged that the treatment of
waste disposal was too vague to permit criticism, that no consideration was given to past experience with the storage of wastes, and
that the "perpetual" care required for disposal of nuclear waste was
infeasible. 76 Any or all of these contentions might well be sufficient
to cast doubt on the thoroughness of the rule's explanation, but, as
will be seen, none of them necessarily calls into question the adequacy of the factfinding procedures employed in the rulemaking.
The appellants' allegations standing alone do not distinguish
fact and policy for individual consideration by the court. An undifferentiated judicial review is less likely to direct the agency's attention to the specifics of factual dispute and is certainly much more
likely to unjustifiably burden the agency's freedom to formulate
policy. For example, each of the petitioner's general criticisms of
the waste disposal portion of the rule can be shown to contain a
very important measure of policy judgment. Indeed the proportion
of policy so far exceeds the proportion of data inputs that the propriety of a factfinding remedy is cast into serious doubt.
The petitioners first criticized the vagueness of the agency's
conclusions. A charge of vagueness will generally attach to any
decision that predicts future results based on a very thin data base.
175
176

Text accompanying notes 73-87, supra.
547 F.2d at 651.
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The extrapolation of future environmental impacts of the undeveloped technology of nuclear waste disposal is a prime example.
Although a conceptual framework for the management of commercial nuclear waste has been under study since 1957, the present
scheme for bringing about the permanent disposal of waste in stable
geologic formations-such as salt mines-took shape in

1975.177

Earlier policies and programs were more or less ad hoc. 7 8 The
reasons for the delay and setbacks in nuclear waste management are
many and to a large degree political.179 For present purposes, however, the most significant result is the unfortunate absence of meaningful technical data on the treatment and permanent storage of
radioactive wastes. Although the data base is growing as the waste
disposal issue receives more and more research and regulatory
priority,' 80 it is still true-and was even more so at the time of the
promulgation of the Uranium Fuel Cycle Regulation-that the
technical solutions to the problem are only slightly better than
8
postulations.' '
Decisions based on extreme uncertainty are quintessential
policy judgments. Although the nature and degree of risk underlying an official endorsement of continued nuclear waste generation
may be highly contested issues, the correctness of the official position
is not assailable in the courts on policy grounds. NEPA sets no
standards for factual predicate sufficiency. If the full scope of uncertainty is exposed and duly considered, the NEPA mandate is
satisfied. Dissatisfied rulemaking participants may enlist the aid of
the courts if they can prove that agency officials are being disingenuous about the unknowns involved, but they must turn to the
avenues of political redress if they simply disagree that the full data
82
base is sufficient to predict a negligible environment impact.
17

7 See

UN-rED STATES NucLxmAn REGmATORy Com~mssioN, ENmoNmrAL
WASTE MANAGEMNT PORTiONS oF Tn LWR

SUnvEY OF TH5E REPRocEsING Am

FUzL CycLE D-1 to D-5 (1976)
SunvEY].
178 Id.

[hereinafter cited as

REVISED

ENvmoinNwrrAL

at D-3.

179 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing of the Energy

Research and Development Administration's High-Level Waste Storage Facilities
Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 1-40 (July 28, 1975).
18o See, e.g., ERDA Studies Geologic Formations Throughout Nation for Data
on Potential Sites for Commercial Nuclear Waste Disposal, No. 76-355, INFOnmATIoN
FROM ERDA (1976); RBvisED ENvIoRONMENTAL SURVEY at C-3 to C-5.
181 See REWsED ENvmoNMENTAL SuRtvE at 1-1 to 1-4.

182 The most obvious forum for attacking the policy decisions is Congress; see
Nuclear Energy Reappraisal Act of 1977, H.1. 881, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 CONG.
REc. H204 (Jan. 6, 1977), which calls for a moratorium on the granting of nuclear
power plant construction licenses pending a five-year study by the Congressional
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It is, of course, very difficult for layman to distinguish between
the vagueness attributable to sketchy reasoning on the one hand
and too thinly supported technical projections on the other. The
difference nonetheless plays an important part in defining the
courts' role in overseeing NEPA decisionmaking. It is incumbent
on the expert agency to explain in comprehensible terms the full
basis of the environmental trade-off with project benefits. In the
case of rulemaking, this explication should emerge in the statement
of basis or purpose. If it does not, there are two alternative inferences a court might draw. The first is that the inadequacy results from administrative oversight or negligence in drafting the
conclusions. The cure is simple and effective: a remand for a fuller
discussion and a reasoned statement that evidences principled NEPA
decisionmaking. A second and more far-reaching inference is that
inadequate development of the underlying facts is the root cause.
By what course a court could divine the pertinent facts and judge
policy discretion without further differentiated presentations by
the agency and the aggrieved participant is very unclear; however, a
protestant might convince the court that a second agency explanation would resolve nothing. The usual case, especially in areas of
technical uncertainty, would require that the court be guided by
the agency's expertise in setting out the factual and policy conflicts.
A preference for judicial restraint in this context is reinforced
by the well-established concept that NEPA guarantees no particular
result, only the genuine consideration of all relevant issues.18 3 The
best evidence of genuine consideration is the agency's description of
the decisionmaking product. A reviewing court cannot evaluate
whether an agency has sufficiently acknowledged environmental
concerns without the benefit of a detailed explanation of the official
assessment. A true assessment may hinge on yet undeveloped facts,
but a reviewing court precipitously encumbers the smooth functioning of the partnership if it presumes that to be the case before
allowing the agency a chance to prove otherwise. Indeed, the general analysis of NEPA presented above 184 predicted that, in light
of the Act's failure to set definite priorities among confficting social
goals, more often than not NEPA issues are likely to turn on considerations of policy rather than of fact.
Office of Technology Assessment. Plant licensing cannot resume under the bill until

Congress can determine that, inter alia, radioactive wastes can be disposed of with
"no reasonable chance" of affecting "the land or people of the United States."
83
1 See text accompanying notes 123-58 supra.
184 Id.

192
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The majority faulted the Commission for not organizing and
distilling the major issues, thereby making their reasoned response
to the "significant" information and criticism submitted difficult to
discern. 8 5 This objection simply reiterates the inadequacy of the
statement of basis and purpose. As Judge Tamm pointed out in
detail, the "concise and general statement" required in informal
rulemaking should provide all the necessary evidence of reasoned
decisionmaking including the resolution of factual and normative
controversies. 8 6 A remand for extra-hybrid procedures is premature before it is determined that the agency cannot provide reasoned answers to all substantial issues by processes of its own
choosing. Again, the majority prefers to assume rather than explain
why the Commission's processes are inadequate. This assumption
is even weaker considering the majority's own admission that an
agency is obliged only to acknowledge and consider the key
87
criticisms, not positively rebut them.'
The majority's second criticism and reason for extra factfinding
procedures is no more satisfactory than the first. The majority
opinion makes two references to "past mistakes" in the storage of
radioactive wastes generated by nuclear weapons production reactors. If a reasonable connection can be made between these past
experiences and the proposed engineering solutions to the commercial waste problem, then the issue is at least potentially ripe for
factual resolution. The connection, however, is not explained by
the court, and it is certainly not obvious. The facts are that commercial waste and weapons waste differ significantly in chemistry,
physical composition, and radioisotopic constituency. 88 Furthermore, weapons waste storage began under hasty wartime conditions
and its environmental hazards continue to be subordinate in importance to national security considerations. The circumstances
and considerations of commercial waste disposal are entirely
different.
Even conceding some factual relevance, the larger question is
whether the agency can ignore the "lessons" of past mistakes if it
makes the policy judgment that changed circumstances and new
programmatic solutions sufficiently diminish their value. The
185 547 F.2d at 646.

186 Id. 658-59 (Tamm, J., concurring).
187 Id. at 646.
188 For description of military wastes, see UNTE

STATES ENERGY REsEAnc

AND DEVELOPMENT ADM-NISTRATION, WASTE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, HANFORD
(Final Environmental Statement).
RESERVATION, EICHLAND, WASHINGTON (1975)
For a description of commercial wastes, see REVISED ENVmONmENTAL SuRVEy at

3-6 to 3-12.
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regulatory philosophy and technical approach to the disposal of
radioactive waste has changed rapidly.8 9 If the Commission can
make a reasonably supported showing that major restructuring of
waste management has permanently corrected the shortcomings of
past decisions, further post hoc factfinding on the issue becomes
pointless. One can conclude that the Commission did not abuse
its decisionmaking discretion to ignore facts mooted by changes in
policy. Laboring over past mistakes of remote relevance may instill
general caution into administrative decisionmaking, but is certainly not an indispensable portion of the factual predicate for
future solutions. It is even less likely that extra hybrid procedures
are necessary to bring about these speculative benefits. As was the
case in considering the criticism of vagueness, the prudent course
would first call for the agency's explanation of relevant history
before intruding further.
The final criticism-infeasibility of perpetual storage-best
demonstrates the pitfalls in confusing the importance of facts and
policy. The focus of this dispute is the time frame involved in
providing for the ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes. Despite
the absence of agreement on the precise number of years required
for the toxic radioactive elements to decay to innocuous levels, one
undisputed proposition is that waste repositories will be required
to retain their integrity for unprecedented lengths of time-at least
thousands of years. The critical technical inquiry centers on the
probability that these engineered repositories will remain virtually
impervious to natural and man-made forces for periods functionally
equivalent to perpetuity.
Given the large number of variables that must be accounted
for in assessing the risk of waste storage, including many unquantifiables, it is impossible to isolate any one as clearly determinative
of the most accurate result. The results of risk assessment, furthermore, are never clearly drawn. Instead they are inexact representations of the range of hazards considered probable. For example, in
simplified terms, the boundary levels of risk are usually estimated
by assuming a worse case or conservative set of assumptions and a
most likely or realistic set. The level of risk associated with each
set can then be computed. 100 If the assumptions are reasonably
quantifiable and carefully chosen, there can be a high degree of
confidence that actual risk is bounded by the high-low values pro-

18 9 See REvisnE

ENvmoNMNTAL SURvEY at D-1 to D-4.
190 See, e.g., United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety
Study (Executive Summary) (1975); Verkuil, supra note 14, at 222-26.
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duced. Of course, the more uncertainty accompanying the selection
and quantification of variables, the less confidence there is in the
boundary values. This exercise resolves nothing, however. A high
confidence or low confidence range of risk probabilities produces no
real results. The ultimate decision is whether to accept the risk
and the uncertainty that the risk estimate is in error. A decision
to act in light of a risk assessment should be recognized for its true
character: a policy decision that the anticipated cost of proceeding
is within acceptable limits. Changing the data input of one
variable in a risk assessment may change the best estimate solution
or alter the conservative boundary value, but it may have no effect
on the ultimate decision. This result is understandable if, for
example, changing a necessary waste repository lifetime from one
thousand years to two hundred and fifty thousand years changes the
likelihood of a failure in geologic containment from once every
trillion years to once every ten thousand years. 191 A policy decision
to accept the risk is rational in either instance.
For purposes of NEPA rulemaking, the difference may be even
less critical as the choice is clearly within the agency's discretion.
It should be reemphasized that NEPA sets no concrete standards for
the agency's choice among substantive alternatives. What is important under NEPA is airing the conflicting evidence and exposing
the official position to criticism. Arriving at a correct result through
procedural testing is meaningless in this context. There is no correct result because the final conclusion is primarily a function of
expert policy judgment. 92
Before the petitioners' attack on the perpetual nature of the
waste disposal task in this case can justify extra-hybrid procedures,
it should be at least probable that the NEPA cost-benefit disclosure
will be significantly affected thereby. If the court is unable to judge
whether the balance struck depends in any real sense on the issues
in contention, then it cannot reach the further conclusion that
adversarial procedures are necessary to draw them out. Judging
the contribution to be made by considering the waste-disposal timeframe in turn depends upon whether the agency policy choice has
subsumed the factual controversy. The court must find that the
challengers' data input has not already been disposed of as an
element of uncertainty found acceptable and that full disclosure is
impossible without adversarial prompting. Such a finding is pre191 This range of probabilities is close to the actual official estimate for the most
likely events that could lead to the failure of geologic containment. BEvss
E.vmONMENTAL SURVEY at 2-11.

192 Notes 183-84, 123-58 supra & accompanying text.
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mature until the full basis of the rule is explained by the agency on
remand if necessary. Although the court might be initially persuaded that the uncertainty involved was not sufficiently exposed,
only a significant empirical dispute laregly independent of policy
judgments warrants a remedy more involved than a fuller official
explanation. No such case was made by the petitioners or analyzed
by the court.
In each of the areas found in need of clarification through
extra proceedings-the vague justifications presented by the Commission, the operational history in another program, and the risk
assessment time-frame-the importance of sharpening the factual dispute is not as self-evident as the majority would make it. On the
contrary, the importance of policy judgment seems much larger.
The court's mischaracterization of policy as fact in its examination of the alleged shortcomings in the waste disposal segment
of the fuel cycle rule throws great suspicion on the appropriateness
of the procedural remedy. Of course, the court was facilitated in
this simplistic approach by the Commission's cursory presentation
of the rule's basis. The inappropriateness of the remedy, however,
has greater ramifications than a one-time penalty on an agency's
inattentiveness. The court's opinion has all the indicia of a major
pronouncement on the general desirability of adversarial procedures
in NEPA rulemaking. This pronouncement, however, does not
square with what one would prescribe on the basis of NEPA's procedural and substantive mandates. The subtle distinctions between
fact and policy specifically presented by the criticisms of plaintiffs
in NRDC v. NRC are likely to crop up again and again in the
NEPA context. This state of affairs is attributable to the absence
of concrete policy directions in the broad NEPA charter. A careful
study of NEPA's administrative reform and substantive policy mandates indicates that adversariness is not necessarily an assurance of
successful rulemaking; instead, the burden involved may well outweigh the benefit.
The court's formula for compliance with NEPA's procedural
mandate introduced no new concepts beyond the well-established
requirement that all relevant issues must be genuinely considered. 193
Full consideration is the key to administrative reform and the proof
of consideration must obviously come from the record. The emphasis is, therefore, on the existence of a full record, not on how
19 3 The majority opinion did contain some dicta concerning an agency's affirmative obligation to develop the issues independent of outside contributions, 547 F.2d
at 645. How this concept relates to the procedures afforded participants is
unexplained.
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the evidence came into being or the perceived desirability of the
result.194 If there are possible conflicting lines of evidence, each
perhaps lending support to a different policy alternative, a reviewing
court is concerned that both are in the record and that the official
reconciliation is explained. The court cannot judge whether the
best evidence was adopted because such a judgment would ultimately consist of determining which policy alternative before the
agency is to be preferred-a determination which NEPA confides to
the play of political forces. Given the expository importance rather
than the evidentiary significance of a NEPA record, an emphasis on
adversariness is misplaced.
The petitioners in this case had three opportunities to expose
the environmental dangers they found in the official position. If
the Commission had presented an adequately supported decision
and explained how the challengers' objections were discounted on
policy grounds, if that was the case, the NEPA disclosure presumably would have been complete. All the evidence considered by
the court, however, proved that the Commission's explanation was
incomplete. The remedy tailored to fit the shortcoming, therefore,
is a remand for the missing exposition. If NEPA does not require
substantial evidence of an accurate result-the single judicial interpretation to this point 195-then a remedy designed to promote factfinding accuracy does not automatically return advantages commensurate with the accompanying burdens.
It is also doubtful that extra procedures genuinely improve the
NEPA substantive policy results looked for by an activist court.196
When fashioning a remedy, the court must realize that interference
between conflicting environmental and agency-mission priorities
limits the utility of adversarial devices in substantially policyoriented decisionmaking. In this case, any expectations for meeting
a NEPA substantive review standard must be tempered with the
realization that any judgment on the present feasibility of radioactive waste disposal contains two policy choices. The first is the
acceptable accuracy in predicting the risk involved in storing the
toxic substances for exceedingly long periods of time. The second
related judgment is whether the power generated is benefit enough
to offset the unavoidable environmental costs, including the cost of
uncertainty. Because a nuclear reactor generates approximately
194 For a discussion of NEPA administrative reform, see text accompanying

notes 123-42, supra.
195 See text accompanying notes 123-58, supra.

196 For a discussion of NEPA substantive policy mandate, see text accompanying notes 142-58, supra.
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the same waste per kilowatt-day regardless of design, the only alternatives available when considering the cost-benefit ratio of radioactive waste disposal are proceeding with nuclear power generation
or abandoning that form of energy altogether. An agency chartered
to consider an isolated portion of a national environmental problem will abandon an important, long-standing energy source only
on the dearest evidence of overriding harm. Unfortunately, minimal evidentiary clarification is produced through the use of adversarial procedures in this situation. To be sure, cross-examination
on the facts supporting predicted geologic stability of salt formations
might produce insights into the uncertainty of the problem, but
cross-examination on the "philosophy" of "stable social structures
for unprecedented periods" 197 is a dialogue with the wrong participants, in the wrong setting, and for the wrong purposes that
inefficiently produces highly speculative results.
The prudential interests that counseled against judicial intervention into agency policy decisions in the past are reinforced in
the NEPA context. The structuring of remedial cures for inadequate decisionmaking should reflect this well-taken restraint as part
of a more general precaution against unnecessarily frustrating administrative innovation. Separating out an undeveloped factual
issue amenable to adversarial sharpening should not automatically
trigger extra-procedural remand. The challenger must first demonstrate that one special device or another at least holds out a real
potential for significantly improving the decisionmaking process.
A second necessary part of such proof should be a prima facie
case that the line of evidence to be explored will contribute more
than marginal worth to the NEPA cost-benefit balance. Neither of
these threshold elements for establishing the desirability of extra
procedures is unfamiliar to the court. On the contrary, challengers
to a rulemaking decision have always had the burden of proving the
necessity of hybrid proceedings 1 8 and protestants to NEPA environmental impact statements have always been required to establish the
substantiality of their exceptions. 199 Logically, both tests should be
combined when N.PA rulemaking is attacked as procedurally inadequate.
The majority's remedial approach departs dramatically from
the one just outlined. A close examination of Chief Judge Bazelon's
197 547 F.2d at 652. The correct forum and participants would be found in
Congress; see note 182 supra.
L98 See text accompanying notes 18-40, supra.
199 See text accompanying notes 143-50, supra.
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opinion suggests that he was willing to overlook the absence of any
details demonstrating unfairness or procedural inadequacy because
of the intensity of the controversy. Judge Tamm's separate statement noted the "preoccupation of the majority opinion in this case
with the half-life of the plutonium atom and the myriad of geological and other technical difficulties one faces in attempting to
safely store a highly toxic substance for a quarter of a million
years." 200 One cannot escape the strong inference that the type of
issue alone was enough to convince the Chief Judge that the agency
should be reprimanded for procedural "insensitivity." How does an
agency display procedural sensitivity? Because the infirmity alleged
lacks any concreteness, Chief Judge Bazelon did not try to assign
specific procedural devices to specific shortcomings. Instead, a long
list of procedural alternatives is enumerated-including the original
procedures administered in a "more sensitive, deliberate manner"capped by the consummate caveat: "It may be that no combination
of the procedures mentioned above will prove adequate, and the
,,201 The
agency will be required to develop new procedures.
agency is thus cast into procedural limbo.
The impediments to efficient administrative reaction erected by
the court's decision are apparent. Not only will the agency be unable to narrow its attention to particular areas of concern, it must
blindly attempt to fit its fact-finding and policy considerations into
an unspecified decisionmaking structure.
The Commission no doubt itself inflicted the rule's fatal wound
when it failed to adequately set off the areas of factual uncertainty
and directly address opinion contrary to the final policy choice.
Consequently, the majority's heavy-handed intervention now requires that the agency forfeit its room to maneuver in policy decisionmaking. This addition of insult to self-injury threatens the
flexibility of rulemaking with no clear benefit promised in return.
Judge Tamm stresses that there is "little to be gained other than
delay" by exacting additional proceedings. 202 This conclusion stems
from his proper observation that part of the decision embodied in
the agency's rule is one of policy or risk assessment.2 03 It then folAlthough Chief Judge
200547 F.2d at 660 n.8 (Tamm, J., concurring).
Bazelon avows only to "systematically catalog the state of the record," 547 F.2d at
645 n.31, he explores the technical problems of waste storage in great detailrelying in part on articles authored after the case was argued in the court of appeals,
id. at 648 n.46 & 47, 650 n.52-and concludes that only the negative side of the

issue is sufficiently developed, see id. at 647-51.
201 547 F.2d at 653.
202Id.

203 Id.

660 (Tamm,

J.,

concurring).
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lows, Judge Tamm reasoned, that the reviewing court must distinguish between the factual determinations and policy choices embodied in the rule. The former matter is subject to a test for
self-evident rationality, but the latter demands only reasons and
explanations, not "findings." 204 The Commission's error was not
providing a suitable record for the court's differentiated review.
The Commission confused the process even more by reducing its
policy judgment to numerical values, 205 thereby giving a misleading
surface impression that the entire endeavor was a factual determination.
Chief Judge Bazelon did not respond directly to Judge Tamm's
argument. Instead, he again emphasized that NEPA demands
articulation of reasoning and public exposure of the risks and
problems 2 0 0-a conclusion that is not disputed. Exactly how unspecified procedural devices were expected to improve the reasoning
or expand the disclosure is not explained. The Chief Judge was
definitely aware of the policy dimensions of the Commission's decision. For example, his majority opinion characterized the petitioner's principal concerns as "not merely technical, but involv[ing]
basic philosophical issues." 207 Indeed, the Chief Judge's primary
criticism of the Commission's decisionmaking was the failure to explain the "uncertainties [that] necessarily underlie predictions of
this importance on the frontiers of science and technology." 208 He
went so far as to point out in a separate statement that the development of scientific or technical standards is a prime example
of the mixture of factual components and legislative judgments as
to acceptable levels of risk.20 9 He then circumvents the obvious
inconsistency between these statements and his broad procedural
remedy by mischaracterizing the Commission's proceedings as almost
entirely technical factfinding. 21 0 This characterization is not only
contrary to his own previous descriptions, but flies in the face of
204 Id. 661 n.11 (Tamm, J., concurring), quoting from Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,
501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2 05
The Commission summarized the Environmental Survey's findings in a
tabular series of specified numerical values (Table S-3) that were to be factored
into the cost-benefit analyses for all proposed nuclear power plants. See 39 Fed.
Reg. 14,188, 14,191 (1974). The underlying policy determination was that the
future environmental effects of radioactive waste disposal would not have a detrimental effect on cost-benefit balances.
206 547 F.2d at 654.

207 Id. 652.
208 Id. 653.
209

Id. 658 n.3 (Bazelon, CJ., separate statement).

210 Id.
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Commission's announced purposes, 211 and a common sense analysis
of the rule's content. Because no real experience, no existing facilities,212 and no certain predictive methodology are available for
assessing the environmental risk of radioactive waste disposal,2 13 the
level of uncertainty infusing every facet of the issue of nuclear waste
disposal appears sufficient alone to shift the entire issue into the
policy category. It is also highly probable that a certain degree
of uncertainty will always be associated with a problem of such
enduring length.214 It remains unexplained, then, why Chief Judge
Bazelon insists on labeling a highly complex legislative judgment
as mere fact gathering and casts a procedural cloud over the whole
rulemaking.
There are several clues to the Chief Judge's motivation, however. These are especially noticeable in light of his similar reactions found in other opinions. First, the Commission's staff expert testimony was undeniably, even in the majority's view, a prediction. This prediction was adopted by the five commissioners

when they approved the rule. Chief Judge Bazelon, however, was
not satisfied with this arrangement. Because of his acute skepticism
of agency objectivity,2 1 he recasts the expert forecasts as unadorned
conclusions and vague reassurances. 21 Without further elaboration,

Chief Judge Bazelon introduces subjective impartiality as a determinant in the NEPA formula-contrary to the majority of prior
judicial interpretations and all reasonable expectations. 217
A second recurring consideration for Judge Bazelon is the
presence of public interests that have, in his view, a special claim
211 The Commission's first announced purpose was to consider regulations "that
would specifically deal with the question of consideration of environmental effects
associated with the uranium fuel cycle in the individual cost-benefit analyses for
light water cooled nuclear power reactors." 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972). When

the rule was promulgated, the Commission repeated that the regulations "address the
question whether to consider the environmental effects associated with the uranium
fuel cycle in the individual cost-benefit analysis for light-water-cooled nuclear power
reactors." 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188 (1974).
212 The majority opinion cites the report of the Hearing Board as evidence of
the lack of background evidence. The report noted the challenger's argument that,
with respect to waste disposal, the Environmental Survey was unreliable because it
dealt with non-existent facilities. 547 F.2d at 652 n.55. The proper inference to
draw from this fact is that assessing the impacts of technology not yet developed
necessarily admits of uncertainty. What weight this uncertainty bears toward the
final 2decision
is a judgment assigned to the agency's discretion.
13
See BEvusx ErvmoNm.NTAL SURvEY at 2-11.
214 See id.
215 In the majority opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon accuses the staff expert witness
of "self-interest" with no explanation why his credibility as a regulator should be
impugned. 547 F.2d at 647 n.43.
216 Id. 650, 653.
217
See text accompanying notes 131-42 supra.
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to judicial protection. In his separate statement he returns again
to the special cases analysis for "areas touching the environment or
medicine [which] affect the lives and health of all." 218 What the
special cases require, Judge Bazelon adds, is more vigorous development of scientific facts. This conclusion is unarguably valid, but
it does not explain how to recognize the underdeveloped facts, what
development is expected, or what the implication is for that large,
crucial area of policy that does not rely on demonstrable facts.
Chief Judge Bazelon defends this simplistic approach by
arguing that there is little difference between remanding because
the record is incomplete or because the procedures were inadequate-a view first voiced by Judge Friendly.219 What escapes both
judges is the plain fact that there is a great deal of difference between requiring an adequate record setting out the reasonably supported policy choices, and binding administrator's legislative freedom with taxing and inconclusive adjudicatory trappings. No
amount of time-consuming cross-examination or discovery will produce facts when only opinions are available. Ultimately, the
agency must evaluate the uncertainty and rationalize the competing
values. Then the agency must carefully display the steps taken and
logic applied. The dictates of informal rulemaking and NEPA are
in complete accord with this process. More adversariness in this
portion of decisionmaking affords very little.
CONCLUSION

NEPA is an attempt to institutionalize a type of technology
assessment for federal actions affecting the environment. 220 The
composition, limitations, and ultimate objectives of technology
assessment must be understood if the administrative agencies are to
discharge their NEPA duties efficiently. Equally important, the
reviewing courts must have the same degree of understanding if
their oversight is to be meaningful yet unobtrusive. Both partners
must have a clear conceptualization of the task and the tools if the
partnership is to function smoothly.
Technology assessment is basically no different from any other
decisionmaking process. There are three successive stages: information is gathered and logically arranged, inferences are drawn using
the best available methodology, and final judgment is exercised in
218 547 F.2d at 657 (Bazelon, C., separate statement).
219 Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Bv. 1267, 1313-14 (1975).
220
See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits
of Instrumental Rationality, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973).
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light of the relevant interests.2 1 What is especially sensitive in
technology assessment, however, is the degree of scientific uncertainty that accompanies each stage. The most prominent limitation
on assessments of emerging technologies is the inordinate cost, or the
impossibility, of collecting objective information. 22 Furthermore,
the time necessary to acquire a totally satisfactory empirical base
would postpone new technologies for periods functionally equivalent to abandonment.
For NEPA assessments, the problem posed by the information
deficiency is compounded by the problem presented by the judicially-imposed duty to comprehensively address policy alternatives
absent concrete standards for preferring one over another. The
balancing of benefits and costs associated with alternatives-including not proceeding at all-assumes some ordering relationship of
national priorities. The inherent limitation of technology assessment is that it can produce useful results only if there is agreement
on the controlling set of priorities. Otherwise, the narrow context
of a single agency decision on one portion of a much larger problem
distorts the assessment framework. 223 Unfortunately, a significant
potential for such distortions exists in the NEPA context where the
congressional intent to adjust the national policy balance to better
account for environmental values is articulated only in the most
general terms.
Finally, the ultimate objective of any technology assessment
like NEPA is to build into the administrative process a device for
identifying uncertainty and describing it in terms comprehensible
to the public.2 4 An environmental assessment provides the vehicle
whereby the negative factors-particularly risks-are pressed upon
the decisionmakers, the Congress, and the public. The political
feedback from these disclosures supplies the governing policy
choices: what priority is to be observed and what costs of uncertainty
will be paid.
NRDC v. NRC demonstrates the extreme difficulty that flows
from an oversimplification of the technology assessment task. The
agency failed to catalogue the rulemaking products according to the
steps of assessment decisionmaking. Its most serious failure was the
221 See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 69, at 390-91. See generally Coates,
Technology Assessment: The Benefits ... the Cost .. .the Consequences, 5 ThE
FurmsT 225 (1971).
222
See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 69, at 372-73.
223 See Green, Limitations on Implementation of Technology Assessment, 14
ATomc ENERGY L.J. 59, 65-67 (1972).
224
See Green, The Resolution of Uncertainty, 12 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 182, 186

(1972).
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inadequate explication of the areas of scientific uncertainty, without
reasoned explanations of how it disposed of the policy conflicts and
opposing opinions. As a consequence, the reviewing court was
unable to discern the rule's full basis. The court majority in turn
oversimplified and misconstrued the rule's multi-purposes into the
single objective of factfinding. With a misplaced emphasis on subjective impartiality and accuracy in special cases, the majority imposed procedural strictures particularly unsuited for assessing
politically sensitive environmental risk.
This failure of the partnership portends greater difficulty for
administrative innovation in formulating NEPA assessments in areas
of growing technological complexity. Agencies will be encouraged
to curtail informal hybrid rulemaking in favor of protracted adversarial proceedings, lest their rulemaking results be summarily reversed for lack of sensitivity to general procedural demands of participants who disagree with the difficult policy choices made. Such
a result will not promote the open decisionmaking and political discourse that are the most environmentally protective by-products of
NEPA assessments.

